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Entering into Marriage. In Claveria v. Estate of Claveria I the husband con-
tested the validity of his wife's will. His contest was met by an assertion
that he had previously entered into an informal marriage that was undis-
solved at the date of his ceremonial marriage to the testatrix and the later
marriage was therefore invalid. In spite of the "vehement assertions" of
both principals to the informal marriage that they had not agreed to be
married, the trial court decided that an informal marriage had been con-
tracted between them. Apparently, this conclusion was arrived at by ig-
noring the lack of evidence of any marital agreement and by relying
instead on the evidence of their living together and holding themselves out
as husband and wife. The trial court, therefore, must have put its ultimate
reliance on the provision of section 1.91(b) of the Family Code2 that the
agreement to marry "may be inferred if it is proved that they lived together
as husband and wife and represented to others that they were married."
But this provision must mean that the court may infer the fact of agree-
ment in the absence of evidence on the matter. If either or both parties
testify concerning their agreement to marry, the court should not entertain
an inference but should merely make a finding on the basis of the evidence
presented. If the evidence offered tends to disprove the existence of the
agreement, there is no room to infer it. Claveria appears to have been a
situation that would have justified reversal on that ground alone. The ap-
pellate court, however, evaluated the evidence in relation to the statutory
text in a somewhat more subtle way to achieve the same result. Both wit-
nesses testified that they had "lived together," that is, that they had cohabi-
tated under the same roof. But living together as husband and wife, as
required by the statute, is especially difficult to demonstrate in the absence
of any agreement to be married. Thus, the court concluded that the evi-
dence was not sufficient as a matter of law to comply with the terms of the
statute.
The only Texas legislative development during 1979 concerning entry
into the marital relationship was the statutory expansion of the list of au-
thorized celebrants to include retired judges, including retired justices of
the peace. 3 Hence the only group of judicial officers lacking authority to
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Southern Methodist University.
1. No. 20048 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas Sept. 21, 1979).
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975).
3. Id. § 1.83 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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marry are municipal judges, whose authority to perform marriages has
been generally opposed by justices of the peace.
It has sometimes been suggested that there should be some sort of legis-
lative restraint on the right to remarry when children of a prior marriage
are unprovided for.4 Following the lead of the United States Supreme
Court, 5 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a statute denying the right
to marry to anyone who is unable to prove that dependent children have
been adequately supported is unconstitutional. 6
Section 2.44 of the Family Code7 provides that a marriage is voidable
and subject to annulment if the petitioner was fraudulently induced to
enter into the marriage. The Supreme Court of Illinois recently inter-
preted a similar statute8 and found that fraud existed when a divorced
woman induced a man to marry her by falsely representing herself as a
widow, knowing that the man's religious beliefs would have prevented him
from marrying her if he had known she was divorced.9 Over fifty years
ago, however, the Amarillo court of civil appeals in an obiter dictum
seemed to cast some doubt on concealed divorce as a ground for annul-
ment. 10 Nevertheless, concealment made with the deliberate intention of
deceiving a person with strong religious convictions against remarriage af-
ter civil divorce would seem to be the sort of fraud with which section 2.44
was designed to deal."
Privileged Testimony. There were several cases decided in other jurisdic-
tions in which one spouse sought to invoke the marital privilege to bar
testimony of the other spouse in a suit in which the first spouse was in-
volved. Overruling earlier cases that would have allowed invocation of the
privilege,' 2 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the testimony of an ex-
4. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978); State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387,
171 N.W.2d 414, 418 (1969); Foster, Marriage. A "'Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 50, 70-71 (1968).
5. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Wisconsin statute struck down).
6. Miller v. Morris, 386 N.E.2d 1203 (Ind. 1979).
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.44 (Vernon 1975).
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 301(l) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) provides:
The court shall enter its judgment declaring the invalidity of a marriage
(formerly known as annulment) entered into under the following circum-
stances:
(1) a party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage at the time the mar-
riage was solemnized, either because of mental incapacity or infirmity or be-
cause of the influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating substances, or a
party was induced to enter into a marriage by force or duress or by fraud
involving the essentials of marriage ....
9. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 76 Ill. 2d 92, 389 N.E.2d 1143 (1979).
10. Stephens v. Stephens, 281 S.W. 1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926, no
writ).
11. The limited scope of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.46 (Vernon 1975) (concealment of a
divorce granted within 30 days of subsequent marriage) was not meant to suggest that con-
cealment of a more venerable divorce is condoned. The object of § 2.46, as well as
§ 1.03(b)(4), is to support the principle underlying § 3.66. See McKnight, Commentary to the
Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 318-19, 343 (1974).
12. State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900); State v. Frazier, 550 S.W.2d 590
(Mo. App. 1977).
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spouse, not involving a confidential communication, was admissible in a
criminal prosecution.' 3 Although California has recently recognized the
enforceability of property contracts between unmarried cohabitants,' 4 it
has shown no inclination to extend the marital privilege to them.15
Alienation of Affection. In 1975 section 4.05 was added to the Family
Code. 16 The text of the section abolished the tort of criminal conversation,
while its title referred to abolition of the action for alienation of affection
as well. In spite of renewed attempts to abolish recovery for alienation of
affection in 1979, the Texas Legislature merely removed the misleading
reference to alienation of affection in the title.' 7 At about the same time,
the Texarkana court of civil appeals turned back an attempt to curtail a
recovery for alienation of affection.
In Williford v. Sharpe'8 a wife had sued another woman for alienation of
the husband's affection. The jury rendered a verdict for actual damages of
$25,000 and exemplary damages of $10,000. The trial court overruled the
defendant's motion for a new trial, conditioned on a remittitur of $10,000
of actual damages by the plaintiff. The defendant appealed on the basis of
an excessive award of damages, and the plaintiff complained of the remit-
titur. The appellate court restored the jury's award and set aside the remit-
titur. "[T]he law requires that mortals determine the amount of damages
suffered for the loss of a spouse's affection when those affections have been
alienated by another person. . . .[T]he loss of the attendant benefits of a
good marriage in this case is worth $25,000.00."' 19
Spousal Support. On the advice of the Family Law Section of the State
Bar of Texas the legislature enacted amendments equalizing the standard
of mutual support between the spouses.20
13. State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
14. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), com-
mented on in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32
Sw. L.J. 109, 116-19 (1978).
15. See People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1979). Unmarried
cohabitants fared somewhat better in their effort to be treated as married for purposes of
obtaining credit under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage
Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 637, § 1, at 1942.
17. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 193, § 4, at 422. As recommended by the Family Law
Section of the State Bar of Texas, S.B. 131 proposed removal of the reference to alienation of
affection in the title of Family Code § 4.05. The senate adopted an amendment to retain the
title as enacted in 1975 and to amend the text to abolish the tort of alienation of affection in
conformity with the title. In the House of Representatives, however, an amendment was
adopted to limit the abolition of the tort of criminal conversation to instances of voluntary
intercourse, thereby authorizing suit for criminal conversation in instances of rape. As
finally passed, S.B. 131 gave effect to the recommendation of the Family Law Section. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
18. 578 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
19. Id. at 500-01. In Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 378 (D.R.I. 1978),
the court held that the cause of action for alienation of affection was inapplicable to the
parent-child relationship.
20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.59, 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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Interspousal Immunity. In 1977 Texas recognized that the doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity as applied to intentional torts had lost its validity.21
In both Nebraska 22 and Iowa 23 the courts have gone a step further to abol-
ish the doctrine in wrongful death actions founded on negligence. In the
ordinary negligence situation, however, both Texas24 and Ohio25 have re-
sisted the argument to carry abolition further. Although Texas has been
unwilling to allow a cause of action in interspousal negligence, the 1979
Texas Legislature implemented a procedure to protect family members
from the infliction of intentional torts within the household. Despite its
non-compensatory purpose, the passage of title 426 of the Family Code is a
modest start toward dealing with family violence. 27
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
AntenuptialAgreements. Most states other than Texas have had a long ex-
perience with premarital agreements that affect marital property interests.
One of the lessons that can be drawn from the cases in those jurisdictions
with respect to the validity of such agreements is that a full disclosure of
the extent of the property of a prospective spouse should be made to one
who would renounce a claim to that property or to income or other prop-
erty that might be generated by it. This point is well illustrated by a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. 28
The Dallas court of civil appeals recently addressed a novel point with
respect to an antenuptial agreement. 29 The agreement had provided that
in case of divorce the wife would not seek temporary alimony. In his ap-
peal from a decree of divorce, the husband took a number of points of
error. In one of these he asserted that the trial court had erred in failing to
credit him in the final settlement for the amount of temporary alimony
that he had actually paid. The appellate court upheld the trial court, rea-
soning that since the trial court had recognized the validity of the agree-
ment, it was deemed to have considered the amount of temporary alimony
21. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), discussed in McKnight, Family Law.-
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 110 (1978); see Korman,
To Love, Honor andDo Violence, 2 FAMILY ADVOCATE, Fall 1979, at 3. The author's thesis
is that interspousal immunity is too often the shield of spousal brutality.
22. Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
23. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979).
24. Bruno v. Bruno, 589 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (following
Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964)).
25. Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (1978).
26. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
27. Title 4 defines family violence as "the intentional use or threat of physical force by a
member of a family or household against another member of the family or household, but
does not include the reasonable discipline of a child by a person having that duty." TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See Solender, Family Law.- Parent and
Child, infra, p. 159.
28. Faver v. Faver, 266 Ark. 262, 583 S.W.2d 44 (1979) (antenuptial agreement set
aside); see MARITAL AND NON-MARITAL CONTRACTS: PREVENTIVE LAW FOR THE FAMILY
(J. Krauskopf ed. 1979). See also Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. 1979) (new
rule enunciated requiring full disclosure).
29. Schecter v. Schecter, 579 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
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paid in making its division, especially since the husband was awarded the
larger share of the community.30 Although it seems that the court re-
garded the agreement as valid in making the ultimate property division,
the terms of the agreement did not preclude the trial court's allowance to
the wife in the nature of temporary alimony.
The amended version of section 59A of the Probate Code31 requires a
new formality that must be complied with before a marriage contract con-
stitutes a valid contract to make a will. A contract to make a will, or not to
revoke a will, entered into after September 1, 1979, must have all the for-
mal attributes of a will.32
Proposed Constitutional Amendment Affecting Premarital Agreements and
Marital Partitions. On November 4, 1980, a constitutional amendment
will be submitted to the people of Texas, which, if adopted, will clarify
some murky points of law with respect to premarital agreements. 33 The
immediate occasion for the amendment is a need to provide that no part of
the gift made by one spouse to the other will be included in the donor's
estate for federal estate tax purposes.34 Since an amendment of article
XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution was deemed advisable, it seemed
appropriate to offer other provisions long needed to clarify the law con-
cerning premarital agreements and marital partitions.
The amendment would clarify the law of premarital agreements in two
important respects. First, it provides that
[P]ersons about to marry and spouses, without the intention to de-
fraud pre-existing creditors, may by written instrument . . . partition
between themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be
acquired or exchange between themselves the community interest of
one spouse or future spouse in any property for the community inter-
est of the other spouse or future spouse in other community property
then existing or to be acquired .... 35
This provision would thus allow prospective spouses to partition prospec-
tive community property prior to marriage so that an agreed undertaking
to make future partitions of such interests would be unnecessary and the
future execution of the undertaking would also be unnecessary. 36 Sec-
ondly, the proposed amendment clarifies the standing of preexisting credi-
tors with respect to premarital agreements. Their position would be the
same as in other instances with respect to transfers made without an inten-
tion to defraud them.37 Upon the adoption of the amendment, modest
30. Id. at 506.
31. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon Supp. 1980).
32. See id. § 59 for the requisites of a will.
33. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., H.J.R. 54, at A-55 (Vernon).
34. See notes 86-94 infra and accompanying text.
35. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., H.J.R. 54, at A-55 (Vernon).
36. See McKnight, Family Law. Husband and W1 fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 105-08 (1979).
37. See McKnight, Management, Control and Liability of Marital Property, in TEXAS
FAMILY LAW & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 180-82 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
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revisions of section 5.4138 would be required to conform it to the constitu-
tional language. Thus, the proposed amendments would significantly clar-
ify the law with respect to premarital agreements. The present rule that
premarital agreements cannot cause separate property to take on commu-
nity character during marriage 39 would not be altered, however.
The proposed amendment would also clarify the law of marital parti-
tions, both as to the position of preexisting creditors and as to the long-
standing split in judicial decisions regarding the validity of partitions of
future acquisitions, most commonly encountered in property settlement
agreements made in anticipation of divorce. 40 As in the case of premarital
agreements, a present partition could validly include future acquisitions.
The breadth of the language of the amendment would also supply author-
ity,41 if authority is needed, for spouses to partition their joint tenancies42
as well as the income from joint tenancies. But the amendment does not
provide a new mode of creating joint tenancies 43 or a means of creating
rights of survivorship in community property.44 Finally, the proposed
amendment would dispose of the present language of the constitution, ad-
ded in 1948, that did not authorize a partition between spouses of unequal,
undivided shares.45
Reconciliation Following Partition in Anticpation of Divorce. Texas nor-
mally does not look to Anglo-American law for guidance in determining
the incidents of our legal institutions rooted in Spanish law. But the old
Spanish commentators are silent on the effects of reconciliation on parti-
tions made on separation (divorcio).46 Hence Texas courts have looked to
38. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (Vernon 1975).
39. Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949); Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66
S.W. 51 (1902).
40. See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413, 418-20 (1976).
41. "[Slpouses . . . may by written instrument from time to time partition between
themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be acquired. 1979 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv., H.J.R. 54, at A-55 (Vernon) (emphasis added).
42. Id., with emphasis on the phrase "or to be acquired." For an analysis of some fed-
eral tax problems arising from joint tenancies of spouses, see Joy, Joint Ownership ofReal
Property by Spouses: Estate and Gift Tax Consequences, 65 A.B.A.J. 1856 (1979). See also
IRS Ltr. Rul. 7911005, 1979 PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS (P-H) 307.
43. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569,
342 S.W.2d 565 (1961); see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
21 Sw. L.J. 39, 42-45 (1967).
44. In creating or seeking to create joint tenancies, most spouses attempt to achieve a
right of survivorship in community property. This result is easily accomplished by will, but
it cannot be achieved by agreement or contract except by creation of a joint tenancy, which
involves a present estate unwanted in most instances. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 98-102 (2d ed. 1975).
45. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15: "husband and wife ... may . . . partition between
themselves in severality or into equal undivided interests . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
46. For the effects of separation itself, see J. MATIENZO, COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM
QUINTUM RECOLLECTIONIS LEGUM HISPANIAE V.9.2., gl.l, nos. 47-57 (2d ed. 1597); A.
AZEVEDO, COMMENTARIORUM JURIS CIVILIS IN HISPANIAE REGIAS CONSTITUTIONES V.9.2,
no. 14 (1583-1598). A brief summary of these points is given in Pugh, The Spanish Commu-
nity of Gains in 1803.: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1969).
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Anglo-American decisions on this point.
Prior to the 1948 constitutional amendment allowing partitions of ex-
isting community property, partitions in anticipation of divorce had long
been recognized. 47 Following Anglo-American precedent, Texas courts
had also concluded that reconciliation nullified such agreed divisions of
property 8 unless the parties agreed otherwise.4 9 The opposite rule applies
in cases of remarriage after divorce, however, as recently illustrated in
Spencer v. Spencer.50
Neither present law nor the proposed constitutional amendment pre-
cludes a couple from contracting to undo a partition or a premarital agree-
ment. Prior to 1968 the terms of a premarital agreement were not subject
to alteration once the marriage had been entered into. Now such an agree-
ment or contract may be undone by a contract entered into any time dur-
ing marriage 5' or on reconciliation following divorce.
Separate Incidents of Employment Contract. Several recent cases involve
instances in which a contract of employment entered into during marriage
may produce separate property. It has been established that property
rights arising from pension provisions of an employment contract are char-
acterized as separate or community in proportion to the time that the bene-
fits were earned while the employee was single or married within the
period of employment.5 2 This characterization results regardless of
whether the contract of employment was entered into prior to, or during,
marriage. For example, an employment contract providing for retirement
after twenty years of service is entered into while the employee is single,
and he is employed for three years prior to his marriage. The employee's
marriage ends in divorce after five years. Thereafter, as a single man, he
completes the twenty-year term of the contract and retires. The employee
was single during fifteen of the total number of years worked, three before
his marriage and twelve after it was dissolved. Hence, for purposes of divi-
sion on divorce, only one-fourth of the pension is characterized as commu-
nity property, with three-fourths as separate property. The retirement pay
is treated as a form of deferred compensation for services previously ren-
dered and as such, is apportioned according to the marital status when
earned. In Sprott v. Sprot153 the court concluded that statutory cost-of-
living increases attributable to such fractional interests should be similarly
47. Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890); Callicoatte v. Callicoatte, 417
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
48. Hornsby v. Hornsby, 127 Tex. 474, 93 S.W.2d 379 (1936); Ellis v. Ellis, 225 S.W.2d
216, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ); Standard v. Standard, 199 S.W.2d
180, 181-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).
49. Speckels v. Kneip, 170 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1942, writ ref'd).
50. 589 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
51. See McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV.
281, 376 (1974).
52. See McKnight, Family Law. Husband and W/fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32
Sw. L.J. 109, 115 (1978).
53. 576 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ dism'd).
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apportioned. 54 On the other hand, Fleet Reserve pay, which is received
for the rendering of current services, is the separate property of the seaman
insofar as it is received for services rendered after dissolution of the mar-
riage.55 This compensation is no more related to employment during mar-
riage than any other type of employment compensation extending over a
period of years when the employee is single. The same conclusion had
been reached by the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals in Taggart v.
Taggart,56 but the Texas Supreme Court's handling of that case may have
been somewhat misleading.57
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo58 received immediate application in Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,59
which also involved disposition of federal Railroad Retirement benefits on
divorce. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that it had implied au-
thority to correct the decision of a court of civil appeals when contrary to a
decision of the United States Supreme Court even though the Texas Con-
stitution and statutes do not provide any express power to do so. 60 Al-
though the trial court had awarded the wife forty percent of the benefits in
issue, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that to remand the case for a
complete redistribution of the estate of the parties would accomplish noth-
ing because the United States Supreme Court forbade state courts from
awarding other property to compensate for the Railroad Retirement bene-
fits, which are not to be considered in making a division.61 Such federal
benefits must therefore be characterized by the divorce court not as sepa-
rate property, which should be considered in making a division,62 but as
something that the court must put out of its consideration entirely.63
The impact of Hisquierdo was felt again in Exparle Johnson,64 in which
the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that Veterans' Administration dis-
ability benefits, for the receipt of which a retired serviceman waived his
military retirement benefits, was not an earned property right and there-
fore was not subject to division by a divorce court.65 The court reached
54. Id. at 655-56. The somewhat related problem of characterizing a life insurance
agent's renewal commissions received after divorce was addressed inconclusively in Bray v.
Bray, 576 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ). See McKnight, Family
Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 114-15 (1978).
55. 576 S.W.2d at 655.
56. 540 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), rev'don other grounds, 552
S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
57. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977), commented on in Sampson, Texas
Supreme Court Family Law Decisions.- 1976-77 Term, in STATE BAR SECTION REPORT:
FAMILY LAW 25, 25-26 (1977). See also Exparte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1975).
58. 439 U.S. 572 (1979), noted in 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 535 (1979); see McKnight, Family
Law- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 115-18 (1979).
59. 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979).
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id. at 401.
62. Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974).
63. For a general overview of the availability of pension and retirement benefits for
division on divorce, see Marvel, Pension or Retirement Benefits as Subject to Award or Divi-
sion by Court in Settlement of Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
64. 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979).
65. Id. at 455-56.
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the same conclusion with respect to "military readjustment pay." Depend-
ing on length of service as to amount, a federal military reservist is entitled
to a sum, not to exceed $15,000, as readjustment pay on release from the
military service. The San Antonio court of civil appeals concluded that
this readjustment pay is community property because "the right [to receive
it] rests on services rendered during coverture. '66 But the Texas Supreme
Court, relying on Hisquierdo and the legislative history of the act, con-
cluded that readjustment pay is an unearned gratuity and hence separate
property. 67
In Lack v. Lack68 a Dallas court of civil appeals construed the Texas
statute69 which provides that the widow of a fireman receives benefits in
case of the fireman's death. In this instance, the court concluded that the
"widow," as designated by statute, should receive the entire award despite
the fact that her status to receive it is a partial consequence of the fireman's
employment during a prior marriage. 70 The court specifically limited its
holding to the situation before it and expressed no view with respect to a
private plan with like provisions or the nature of the fireman's pension
rights on retirement.7' All considered, a better conclusion would have
been an apportionment of the death benefits between the fireman's wives,
unless recourse is had to the principle of sovereign largesse, which tended
to contaminate the reasoning of Spanish commentators and the Supreme
Court of the United States.72 The reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court
in Valdez v. Ramirez,7 3 however, is inapplicable to this situation. In that
case, emphasis was put on the management powers of the employee-
spouse and, alternatively, on the federal supremacy doctrine. In Lack the
decision turned on the legislative intent underlying the Texas statute.
Commingling and Tracing. A lump sum award for loss of earning power
during marriage and during a period after a marriage has been dissolved
presents an entirely different problem. Whether the award is made by
judgment 74 or by the settlement of a worker's compensation claim, 75 the
66. Perez v. Perez, 576 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978).
67. Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1979). A California appellate court has
held that, in general, military retirement pay is separate property. Milhan v. Milhan, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 41, 158 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1979). This conclusion, however, is contrary to the pre-
Hisquierdo view of the California Supreme Court, Milhan v. Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528
P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1976), and the conclusion of
another California appellate court, Gorman v. Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1979) (post-Hisquierdo).
68. 584 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
69. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6243a, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
70. 584 S.W.2d at 898.
71. Id. at 900.
72. See McKnight, Family Law. Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 118 (1979).
73. 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978), commented on in McKnight, Family Law- Husbandand
Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 115, 145-46 (1979); see Note, A New
Element to Consider in Determining Community Property Rights in Retirement Benefits, 19 S.
TEX. L.J. 729 (1979).
74. A means of avoiding commingling by judgment is suggested in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 71-72 (1974).
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situation is one of commingled community and separate elements. Unless
these can be unmixed by tracing, the community presumption with respect
to acquisitions during marriage must prevail.76 The technique of tracing is
similar to that applied in segregating separate elements from community
elements in a commingled bank account. The persistence of that problem,
however, has allowed the courts to fashion guidelines for extricating sepa-
rate funds from the commingled mass. In Harris v. Ventura,77 for exam-
ple, the husband's heirs were able to trace a specific amount of the
husband's separate funds into a bank account containing community
funds. Applying the rule that community property is deemed to be with-
drawn prior to separate property when the withdrawal is made for the pur-
pose of meeting family needs, 78 the court concluded that the separate
deposit could be recovered from the residue of the account. 79 With respect
to an inactive savings account in which nothing more than the wife's sepa-
rate property had been deposited to draw interest, in the absence of a
showing of how much interest had accumulated, the appellate court re-
manded the case to the trial court for a finding on this fact so that the
separate and community elements in the account could be distinguished. 80
In Harris the court also applied tracing techniques to another transac-
tion involving the husband's separate property. Prior to marriage the hus-
band sold certain land and took in payment therefor a promissory note
with a deed of trust lien to secure its repayment. Subsequently, but still
prior to the marriage, the husband assigned the note and lien to a bank.
Though the assignment was absolute in form, it was made as collateral for
a loan. During the marriage the bank reassigned the note and lien to the
husband, presumably on repayment of the loan. Thereafter the husband
foreclosed the lien through a trustee's sale. Repurchase of the land was
achieved by cancellation ofpart of the outstanding separate note without
any addition of community funds. Hence the land was the husband's sep-
arate property and the proceeds of its later sale were traced to a certificate
of deposit and a promissory note that were therefore also the husband's
separate property. The link in this tracing chain that most concerned the
court was the absolute assignment of the note and lien to the bank. The
court was satisfied, however, that the transaction was not meant as any-
thing more than a security device.8' As such, which the assignment clearly
was, even if the separate indebtedness had been paid with community
funds, the redemption of the security would not take the character of the
debt, repayment of which the assignment secured. Therefore, if the debt
75. York v. York, 579 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); cf. Hicks
v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (dealing with a worker's
compensation award made after dissolution of marriage), commented on in McKnight, Fam-
ily Law.- Husband and W!'fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 113 (1978).
76. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
77. 582 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
78. Sibley v. Sibley, 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).
79. 582 S.W.2d at 855-56.
80. Id. at 856.
81. Id. at 857.
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had been paid with community funds, the community was entitled to a
claim for reimbursement.
Acquisitions Related to Separate Property Interests. In Goodridge v. Good-
ridge82 the husband had established a business proprietorship prior to
marriage, which he continued to use as a vehicle for making real estate
acquisitions during marriage. Title to the realty was taken in the name of
the proprietorship-company and purchase money was paid from the pro-
prietorship account. The unpaid balance due on the purchases was repre-
sented by assumption of existing indebtedness of the seller and notes
executed by the company. The husband argued that particular realty
purchased by the company was separate property because in the year in
which it was purchased costs of maintaining the company's properties had
exceeded rents collected by the company. Hence the company account
from which purchase money had been paid represented separate funds. In
the previous year, however, the rents had substantially exceeded company
costs. But the husband's showing that company costs consistently ex-
ceeded profits during the marriage would not have discharged the hus-
band's burden of tracing separate funds into the real estate investment.
The proprietorship was merely the alter ego of the husband and not a sep-
arate entity. Furthermore, a substantial share of the purchase price of the
realty was rooted in a community indebtedness, and no effort was made to
segregate separate funds in the company account at the date of marriage or
to trace their subsequent disposition.
A spouse's lending his credit to a corporation not owned by either
spouse 83 (that is, when the spouse is signatory on a note to borrow funds
for corporate use) does not cause the community to acquire any interest in
the corporate enterprise. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that
both spouses are employed by the corporation as salaried employees, or by
the further fact that one of the spouses later acquires some of the shares of
the corporation. 84 On the other hand, a court recently concluded that the
joinder of a nonowner spouse in leasing separate realty owned by the other
spouse does not cause the joining spouse to have a "property interest" in
the leased premises, but nonetheless causes a protective covenant in the
lease to violate the Texas antitrust statutes.85 Such arguments as these
would go unnoted except for the considerable attention given them by the
appellate courts. It is nonetheless useful for the courts to put such argu-
82. 591 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
83. For an analysis of the situation of a business entity owned by a spouse as separate
property, see Comment, Community Property Rights and the Business Partnership, 57 TEXAS
L. REV. 1018 (1979).
84. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
85. See Berman v. City Prods. Corp., 579 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1979, writ granted). One is reminded of Ryan v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 433 S.W.2d 2 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ), in which the court rejected the argument that a spouse of
an owner of land acquired an interest therein when she joined in the conveyance of the land
held in her husband's name and a reversion of a mineral interest was retained in the names
of both spouses.
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ments to rest so that they will not be made again. But when the Internal
Revenue Service rules that a donor-spouse retains an interest in property
given to the other spouse because community income may be produced
therefrom, 86 there is a characterization problem that must be given serious
attention. 87 To meet the resulting estate tax impact of this situation the
Sixty-sixth Legislature has proposed an amendment to the Texas Constitu-
tion.88 The proposed amendment provides that a donor-spouse is deemed
to give the donee-spouse the right to all income from the property given to
that spouse. Whereas it has long been understood that a donor-spouse 89 or
other donor 90 may make such an express9' or implied 92 gift to include all
future income from the donated property, the proposed amendment puts
the burden of showing a contrary intent upon the person who would make
that assertion. As to the other community property states, only in Louisi-
ana and Idaho is all income from separate property normally community
property in accordance with the model of old Spanish law.93 In Louisiana
a legislative provision similar to the proposed constitutional amendment
has already been enacted to meet the ruling of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice, 94 but no such legislation has been passed in Idaho.
Names of Grantee and Recitals in Deeds. It is fundamental that acquisi-
tions made prior to marriage are separate property,95 whereas those made
during marriage are presumed to be community.96 If one spouse during
86. Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363.
87. Estate tax cases arising under this ruling are discussed in McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 144-45 (1979), and in the
text accompanying notes 124-33 infra.
88. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., H.J.R. 54, at A-55 (Vernon); see notes 34-45 supra and
135-36 infra and accompanying text.
89. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 26, 112 S.W.2d 1047, 1048 (1938) (continuing
outright gift of wife's earnings made to her by husband); Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co.,
115 Tex. I, 6, 274 S.W. 120, 121 (1925) (continuing outright gift by husband to wife of
income from her property); Hutchinson v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 488 (1873) (gift by husband in
trust for wife); Shepfin v. Small, 23 S.W. 432, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ) (husband's
joining with wife to create trust of wife's separate property for wife).
90. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680, 681-82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd); McClel-
land v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refd); Monday v. Vance, 32
S.W. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ) (semble).
91. Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 6, 274 S.W. 120, 121 (1925) (husband
to wife); Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680, 681-82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ refd) (wife's
father to wife).
92. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 26, 112 S.W.2d 1047, 1048 (1938) (husband to
wife); McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ reed) (hus-
band's father to husband).
93. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 161
(1971). In the other community property states, however, some community property income
may be produced from separate property. Id. 162, 165-68. See Cockrill v. Cockrill, 601
P.2d 1334 (Ariz. 1979).
94. 1979 La. Sess. Law Serv., Act No. 709, § 1, at 1352 (West), effective Jan. 1, 1980,
repealing 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv., Act No. 627, § 2839 (4) (West), effective Jan. 1, 1980.
See generally Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited- 1979 Legislative Modications
ofthe 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83 (1979); Spaht, Interim Study Year,
39 LA. L. REV. 551 (1979).
95. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1975).
96. Id. § 5.02. For a general overview of interfamilial gifts, see Marvel, Unexplained
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marriage uses separate property to purchase property to which title is
taken in the name of the other spouse, it is presumed that a gift to the
grantee is intended. 97 If separate property is conveyed by one spouse to
the other, a gift is also presumed. 98 In Johnson v. Johnson99 the husband
contracted prior to marriage to buy land, which was then conveyed to both
spouses during marriage. The entire purchase price was paid with the hus-
band's separate funds. The transaction could be thus analogized to a
purchase with separate property or to a conveyance of an undivided one-
half interest in separate property. The evidence offered by both spouses
nonetheless supported the trial court's conclusion that no gift was in-
tended.' °° Similarly, when a third person conveys land to both spouses,
the absence of valuable consideration will rebut the presumption of com-
munity character of the property conveyed, and other facts may demon-
strate that no beneficial interest was intended to pass to one of the spouses.
In Cedotal v. Cedotal'0' the wife's parents made such a grant to both
spouses, reciting a valuable consideration that was subsequently proved to
be fictitious. Further facts demonstrated that the donors did not intend the
husband to take any beneficial interest. 10 2 The gift was, therefore, the
wife's separate property. If the donors had intended that both spouses take
a beneficial interest, each would have a one-half interest in the tenancy in
common as his or her separate property. 0 3
Acquisition of property by a spouse with a recital of separate ownership
presents a different situation.1°4 In Holcemback v. Holcemback'0 5 a con-
veyance was made to the husband "as his separate property and estate" by
his mother, with the recital that the consideration was paid from "his sepa-
rate funds and estate."' 0 6 The wife was in no sense a party to the transac-
tion. There was evidence of part-payment of the purchase price with the
husband's separate funds, with payment of the rest of the purchase price
with other separate property of the husband shortly after the convey-
Gratuitous Transfer of Properlyfrom One Relative to Another as Raising Presumption of Gift,
94 A.L.R.3d 608 (1979).
97. Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856).
98. Powell v. Jackson, 320 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1958, writ reed
n.r.e.).
99. 584 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
100. Id. at 309. Similar characterization cases are discussed in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 33 (1973); McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48 (1969). The court in Brock v. Brock, 586
S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ), stated that acquisition of property
in the names of both spouses established prima facie that the property is community.
Rather, the presumption of community arises from acquisition during marriage, regardless
of the name of the spouse in which title is taken. See also Cedotal v. Cedotal, 586 S.W.2d
159, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (homestead property).
101. 586 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (rent houses).
102. Id. at 160-61.
103. White v. White, 590 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
104. For a recent foreign example, see In re Gaites, 466 F. Supp. 248 (M.D. Ga. 1979).
See also Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955).
105. 580 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
106. Id. at 878.
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ance.10 7 There was also evidence that the property was purchased with
community funds. The appellate court sustained the trial court's conclu-
sion that the presumption of community acquisition had not been factually
rebutted. 108 In Contreras P. Contreras,10 9 on the other hand, a conveyance
was made to the wife "as her separate property." The property had been
previously owned by tenants in common, one of whom had recently died.
The other tenant in common, joined by the husband as executor of the
estate of the decedent, made the conveyance to the wife. Because of the
husband's involvement in the conveyance, the husband and his heirs were
barred from contesting the validity of the recital of the wife's separate in-
terest. 1'0
Marital Debts and Credit Acquisitions. Debts incurred by either spouse
during marriage are recoverable from community property subject to the
debtor-spouse's sole or joint management."I ' Such a debt is not recover-
able from community property subject to the sole management of the other
spouse unless the spouses acted jointly in incurring the debt, or the spouse
incurring the debt acted as agent of the other spouse, or some other rule of
law, such as a provision of the Internal Revenue Code," 12 so provides. In
short, a creditor's inquiry as to the nature of a debt contracted by a spouse
usually concerns its collection, that is, what property may be reached for
its satisfaction. Therefore, from the creditor's point of view such debts are
both "community" and "separate," although it is customary to describe
them as "community debts"' '1 3 since the creditors will normally look to
community property for their satisfaction; they are not precluded from do-
ing so even if the debtor-spouse has substantial separate assets." 1 4 A credi-
tor may agree with a debtor-spouse, however, to look only to that spouse's
separate property for satisfaction. If such an arrangement is made, the
debt is termed a "separate debt."' 15 Such agreements rarely occur. On the
other hand, if he wishes to do so, the creditor may bind himself to look
only to community assets for satisfaction.
107. Cf. Rath v. Rath, 218 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, no writ) (down
payment on homestead temporarily made with community funds).
108. 580 S.W.2d at 879.
109. 590 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
110. Id. at 222; see Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. 1968); Hodge v. Ellis,
154 Tex. 341, 348, 277 S.W.2d 900, 904 (1955). In Contreras the immediate purpose for the
conveyance was to give the wife sufficient collateral to borrow money to pay for the dece-
dent's funeral expenses. That purpose, however, was irrelevant in establishing the character
of the property conveyed.
111. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.6 1(c) (Vernon 1975); see McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 138-39 (1978); McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 90-92 (1976).
112. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 3 1,
42 (1972).
113. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 81 (1974);
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 29 (1973).
114. The nondebtor spouse, however, may interpose the provisions of TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.62 (1975).
115. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 76 (1975).
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The concept of "community debts" and "separate debts" is used in com-
puting the net worth of marital assets for purposes of division on divorce
and in determining the extent of the estates of decedents. 116 The use of
these notions in a credit context also assists us in characterizing property
bought on credit. Hence, unless the seller agrees to look only to separate
property for payment, a purchase on credit during marriage is construed as
being made on "community credit,"' 17 and the property is therefore char-
acterized as community property."l 8 If the indebtedness is subsequently
paid with separate property, the character of the property is not thereby
altered. 119
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Intersvousal Gifts andAgreements. The law concerning the taxation of in-
terspousal gifts in Texas has been in a confused state for several years.
Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the value of all
property transferred by a decedent in which he has "retained. . .the right
to the income" therefrom for his lifetime will be included in the decedent's
estate.'20 In a series of Texas and Louisiana cases121 the Internal Revenue
Service has argued that a gift from one spouse to another is only partially
effective for estate tax purposes because the separate property of the donee
produces community income in which the donor shares. Having achieved
success at the trial level in three cases before the Tax Court, 22 the Service
went on to rule that a decedent retained a one-half interest in community
insurance policies on his life, which he had transferred absolutely to his
wife.' 23 In Castleberry v. Commissioner 24 the Tax Court had held that a
husband-donor had retained a one-fourth interest in income producing
community securities 25 that he had given his wife. The Service's ruling,
116. See First Nat'l Bank v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 149-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ) (concerning the estates of deceased spouses who died in 1961 and 1974). See
also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 177(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
117. See Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 333 (1979), discussed in note 279 infra.
118. Contreras v. Contreras, 590 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
119. Id. at 220-21.
120. I.R.C. § 2036; see 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXA-
TION ch. 24 (1959).
121. Frankel v. United States, No. 75-H-1806 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1977); Estate of Deobald
v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1977); Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
227 (1977); Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977); Estate of McKee v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) Dec. 35,049 (1978).
122. Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977); Estate of Castleberry v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977); Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) Dec.
35,049 (1978).
123. IRS Ltr. Rul. 7907011, 1979 PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS (P-H) 195.
124. 68 T.C. 682 (1977), nonacq. 1979-1 I.R.B. 7, analyzed in Campfield, Inierspousal
Transfers, 32 Sw. L.J. 1091 (1979), and discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband &
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 144-45 (1979).
125. The husband-donor had given his wife his one-half community interest in the secur-
ities. Since the income from that one-half interest was community property, the husband
was entitle to one-half of the income from the one-half interest transferred, ie., one-quarter
of the income from the whole property. Hence, one-quarter of the value of the securities was
included in the donor's gross estate.
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however, asserted that one-half of the entire value of the policies, rather
than one-half of the transferred half, was the retained interest. This con-
clusion harks back to Estate of Bomash v. Commissioner, 126 in which the
court concluded that one-half of a gift of community property was includ-
able in the donor's estate, since the transfer did not alter the donor spouse's
position as regards community income from what previously had been
community property. Under section 2036, however, we are concerned with
only the subject matter of the gift, i e., the donor's community half and its
income. The income from the donee's one-half community interest is irrel-
evant, much like that of a decedent's life estate that terminates on the
death of the life tenant and has no consequences with respect to his taxable
estate. 127 With respect to the circumstance that the property in Castleberry
was not in fact income producing, the Service took the view, sustained in
Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 28 that actual income production is not
essential to the retention of an income interest.' 29
In Estate of Wyl, v. Commissioner 30 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed two of the decisions of the Tax Court favoring the position of the
Service. The court concluded that the donor-spouse's community partici-
pation in the income produced from the property given to the other spouse
does not constitute a "right to the income" under section 2036(a)(1),13 1
since the donee "may dispose of the principal in any way he or she sees fit,
or convert it to uses which do not produce income." 132 Although the court
somewhat understated the remedies of the donor-spouse for the sole man-
ager's disposition of such community income as should be produced, 133 the
court's focus was on the "right to income," which the court characterized
as "neither 'significant', [nlor 'substantial'."'' 34 It is nonetheless appropri-
ate for a donor-spouse to make a specific provision for the inclusion of all
income in future gifts of principal.
In response to the decisions sustaining the position of the Internal Reve-
nue Service the Texas Legislature has proposed a constitutional amend-
ment 35 to be submitted to the people on November 4, 1980. The.
126. 432 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1970).
127. If the Service's argument is applied to a gift of separate property from one spouse to
the other, there is no gift for estate tax purposes, because the income status of the property is
not altered.
128. 1978 T.C.M. (P-H) 484.
129. Id. at 489.
130. 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1980). Wyl,, Castleberry, and Frankel v. United States, No.
75-H-1806 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1977), were all consolidated for appeal.
131. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1). The majority of the court also held that the donor-spouse's
interest created by operation of law was not "retained" within the meaning of the statute.
601 F.2d at 1294. One judge dissented on this point.
The court appeared oblivious of much of the literature on the operation of § 2036 in
community property states. The court seemed wholly unaware of Campfield, supra note
124.
132. 610 F.2d at 1292.
133. Id. at 1291; see note 141 infra.
134. Id. at 1294.
135. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv., H.J.R. No. 54, at A-55 (Vernon). For the Louisiana
response, see note 94 supra. Louisiana's equal management reform came none too soon. In
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amendment restates article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution to
provide, in part: "if one spouse makes a gift of property to the other that
gift is presumed to include all the income or property which might arise
from that gift of property." 136 The amendment also allows spouses to pro-
vide, by an agreement in writing, that future income from any separate
property shall be the separate property of the owner of the property pro-
ducing it. Hence that income would be subject to the sole management of
the owner as any other separate property.
An interspousal renunciation or disclaimer was attempted in Campbell v.
Campbell.137 There the court was called upon to construe an instrument
executed by the wife in favor of the husband, purporting to disclaim any
interest in a joint venture in which the husband participated. This dis-
claimer, which was admittedly made without consideration, also stated
that it was not a gift. The court was therefore left with no other recourse
than to treat the instrument as a nullity. 138 Instead of the disclaimer, the
wife's sworn statement that she had never had any property interest in the
venture would have been prima facie evidence to that effect. The couple
might then have proceeded to partition any community interest that there
might have been and the wife could then have given the husband whatever
interest was partitioned to her. These instruments might then have been
put aside for whatever use the future might suggest.
Disposition of Solely Managed Community Property. On two significant oc-
casions the legislature of Texas has rejected proposals to define powers of
gratuitous disposition of community property. In its first effort to define
marital property and its incidents, the Senate rejected the rule that if the
husband had disposed of community property "with the intention to de-
fraud his wife," he or his heirs would reimburse her for one-half the dispo-
sition on dissolution of the marriage. 39 In 1967 the only section of the
proposed Matrimonial Property Act that was wholly deleted by the legisla-
ture was the provision for joinder of the spouses in making gifts. ' 40 Mean-
while, however, the rule had been clearly enunciated by the courts that if
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 609 F.2d 727, 735 (5th Cir. 1979), Louisiana's old rule by which the
husband was "head and master of the community" was said to constitute an impermissible
gender-based discrimination under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.
136. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., H.J.R. No. 54, at A-55 (Vernon). By using the language
"income or property" in the amendment, the draftsmen were evidently adverting to the old
dispute as to whether, for example, stock dividends are income or part of the property inter-
est from which the dividends were generated.
137. 587 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
138. Id. at 514.
139. JOURNALS OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS (House Journal)
185, (Senate Journal) 242 (H. Smither ed. 1931).
140. Proposed section 4623 of S.B. 33 (60th Legislature, 1967) provided:
Gifts to third persons.
The spouses shall join in, or the non-joining spouse shall consent to, disposi-
tion of community property to a third person when the disposition is without
substantial consideration and is not in discharge of a legal, moral or civic obli-
gation.
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the husband made a gift of community property with actual intent to de-
fraud his wife, she would be allowed relief. 14 1 The mere deprivation of the
wife of her community share as a result of a gratuitous transfer did not
constitute fraud, however. Actual subjective intent to defraud had to be
proved. In the last decade, however, the courts have developed and re-
fined the principle of constructive fraud. The burden of proof is put upon
the person, either the donor-spouse or the donee, who seeks to sustain the
gift to show that a gratuitous transfer of community property by either
spouse was reasonable under the circumstances in which it was made. 142
The better approach for handling the final disposition of assets of a de-
ceased donor is to allow the gift to stand and to allow the defrauded spouse
reimbursement if there are other assets from which reimbursement may be
made.' 43 This approach honors the capacity of the donor to make the
transfer within the management powers defined by statute, 44 which causes
the transfer to be valid when made. 145 But the subject matter of the trans-
fer is frequently such a significant part of the community estate that reim-
bursement from other assets is not possible. Hence disposition of the non-
donor-spouse's community share is treated as constructively fraudulent
and therefore presumptively void as to the other spouse. 146 The subject
matter of such gratuitous dispositions is often a community life insurance
policy in which someone other than the surviving spouse is named as a
beneficiary. 147 In the most recent instance' 48 of asserted constructive
fraud, the donor's widow complained of the decedent's naming their six-
year-old son as the beneficiary of the lion's share of the community assets,
which consisted almost wholly of life insurance policies. Several months
before the husband's death, the wife abandoned her husband and the child
to live with another man. The husband promptly changed the beneficiary
141. Relief inter vivos: Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1936, no writ); Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ).
Relief post mortem: Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901); Stramler v. Coe,
15 Tex. 211 (1855) (dictum); Krenz v. Strohmeir, 177 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1915, writ refd).
142. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 79-80
(1974); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 36
(1973). See also McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32
Sw. L.J. 109, 136 (1978).
143. Cohrs v. Scott, 161 Tex. I11, 121, 338 S.W.2d 127, 133 (1960); Carnes v. Meador,
533 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ reid n.r.e.); see Kemp v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 1953). For a recent instance of application of
reimbursement principles in this context, see Logan v. Barge, 568 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).
145. When there are other assets from which reimbursements may be made, the testa-
mentary or intestate estate must reimburse the defrauded spouse, and the shares of other
takers must be reduced pro rata.
146. Under this doctrine of marital constructive fraud the transfer is not actually void.
Cf TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968) (transfer is not void unless an
actual intent to defraud is shown).
147. Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref d n.r.e); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Redfearn v. Ford, 579 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of the community life insurance policies in the amount of $73,000 from his
wife to his son, while leaving his wife as beneficiary of the remaining com-
munity policies totaling $25,000. The appellate court affirmed the decree
of the probate court in favor of the son on the grounds that the widow was
healthy and capable of supporting herself, in spite of her lacking any sig-
nificant education or skills, and that the widow was relieved of providing
for the child, who was adequately provided for by the insurance proceeds.
This is the only Texas appellate case in which a court has found that a gift
of considerably more than half the community estate was reasonable
under the circumstances.
Another striking instance of community management and its conse-
quences is exemplified by a pair of Louisiana tax cases considered together
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.149 As "innocent spouses,"' 150 two
wives had appealed from decisions of the Tax Court holding them respon-
sible for their share of their husbands' community earnings during years
when the couples filed no federal income tax returns. In both instances the
wives were living apart from their husbands and had no control of the
husbands' income nor knowledge of its amount or disposition. Both cases
were remanded to the trial court to determine whether the wives were enti-
tled to theft-loss deductions, ' 5' although the husbands might not be subject
to prosecution for theft under Louisiana law. In the court's view, "a tax-
payer-wife who owns income that is appropriated by her husband-man-
ager for his own use should be permitted to claim" a theft loss just as
victims of embezzlement have in several instances.' 52
And just as this state "exemption" of the owner-wife from liability out
of her separate income for community debts does not defeat the fed-
eral collector in his suit for the taxes on her share of the community
income, the state "exemption" of the manager-husband from prosecu-
tion for theft should not defeat the federal taxpayer's claim for a theft
loss deduction. . . .[A]n intent to deprive a wife permanently of her
share of the community income may be inferred from a husband's
wanton appropriation of community assets in pursuit of his own plea-
sure or needs.153
If Judge Wisdom's approach is allowed to stand, the severe injustice of
federal tax law in its application to innocent spouses in community prop-
erty states will be somewhat alleviated.
Since the enactment of the first divorce act in 1841,154 Texas law has
149. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979).
150. See also Johnson v. Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 1337, 1341.
151. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). Theft losses are deductible in the year in which the theft is dis-
covered.
152. 603 F.2d at 501. The court cited Vincent v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 228, 231 (9th
Cir. 1955); Earle v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1934); Weingarten v. Commissioner,
38 T.C. 75 (1962). For a discussion of whether ill-gotten gains of a Texas couple are com-
munity or separate property for income tas purposes, see Johnson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
340 (1979).
153. 603 F.2d at 502.
154. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 19, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, § 9, at 21, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483, 485 (1898).
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included a provision allowing the court to restrain transfers of community
property and prevent the incurring of debts in anticipation of divorce. Be-
cause the 1969 recodification of the 1841 statute as section 3.57'55 of the
Family Code was not altogether clear, that section was recodified in
1979.156 With an abundance of caution the legislature specifically pro-
vided: "In an action to void any transfer or debt the spouse seeking to
void said transfer or debt shall have the burden of proving that the person
dealing with the transferor or debtor spouse had notice of the intent to
injure the rights of the other spouse."
The earnings of an unemancipated child are solely or jointly managed
depending on whether a managing conservator has been appointed for the
child. As enacted in 1969157 section 5.23 of the Family Code provided that
"the parent or parents having custody of the minor" were vested with man-
agement of the minor's earnings. In 1975158 that provision was repealed as
inharmonious with the terminology of title 2 of the Code. In 1979159 the
section was restored with new language. Under present law 160 if no man-
aging conservator has been appointed for the child and its parents are mar-
ried, the child's earnings are subject to the parents' joint management
unless "otherwise provided by agreement of the parents or by judicial or-
der." 161 If a managing conservator has been appointed, however, that per-
son has "the right to the. . . earnings of the child," 62 which carries with it
the right of management. The child's earnings, however, are not to be
confused with the profits of the child's estate, which are nonetheless sub-
ject to the management of the child's parents or parental managing conser-
vator, "except when a guardian of the [child's] estate has been
appointed."'' 63 But distinguishing between what is the parents' and what is
the child's property in cases of judicial recovery for injuries to the child
presents significant problems. 164
Spousal Support. In order to achieve complete parity of the duty of sup-
port between the marital partners, sections 3.59 and 4.02 of the Family
Code were amended in 1979 to remove the double standard of spouse-
support that had earlier prevailed. 165 Section 3.59166 deals with temporary
155. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 888, § 3.57, at 2724.
156. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 193, § 1, at 421.
157. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 888, § I, at 2727.
158. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 254, § 12, at 624; see McKnight, Supplemental Commen-
tary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 8 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 17 (1976), in which the author
recommends new language for the section.
159. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 193, § 5, at 422.
160. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.23 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
161. Id.
162. The rights of a parent as a managing conservator are defined by TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 12.04(4), 14.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980), whereas a nonparent's rights are defined by
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
164. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 1994 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
165. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 193, §§ 2-3, at 421.
166. As amended, the statute reads: "After a petition for divorce or annulment is filed,
the judge, after due notice may order payments for the support of the wife, or for the support
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spousal support pending divorce or annulment. Although the section still
does not specifically mention attorney's fees, its terms are broad enough to
allow an order for the payment of the attorney's fees for either spouse,
pending divorce or annulment, as an element of support.167 An obstacle to
that end is the 1961 opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Wallace v.
Briggs.168 That case is distinguishable, however, because the court was
there interpreting the provisions of what is now section 3.58169 on tempo-
rary orders respecting property. Furthermore, other developments and
modifications of the law of spousal capacity have so changed the general
setting of the subject 170 that the underlying rationale of that holding is now
inapplicable to a proper interpretation of section 3.59, if indeed it was ever
applicable to that section. In 1969 the legislature replaced the term "tem-
porary alimony"171 with "temporary support." This modernization of the
statute comports with the principles of the 1963 legislative reform by which
married women were given full contractual capacity. 172 Prior to that en-
actment the wife had no contractual capacity except in those few instances
specifically authorized by statutes or judicial interpretation; 73 in con-
tracting for necessaries she acted merely as her husband's agent. 74 There-
after, the wife's contract was her own. In the pre-1963 context the wife's
contract for an attorney's services was one for necessaries and hence the
husband's contract.' 75 Thus, in the pre-1963 context in which Wallace v.
Briggs was decided, the husband's contractual liability to the wife's attor-
ney was not a current expense of the wife but simply a factor to be consid-
ered in making a division of property under what is now section 3.63.176
Wallace v. Briggs was solely concerned with former article 4638, the pred-
ecessor of section 3.58. The court viewed that statute as authorizing the
trial court to make temporary orders concerning the use, possession, and
preservation of property, but not as authorizing an interlocutory partial
division of the estate of the parties.177 Because the husband's contractual
liability for the wife's attorney's fees was a factor to be considered in the
final division of the estate, it was premature and hence impermissible to
of the husband until a final decree is entered." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon Supp.
1980).
167. See, e.g., Prewitt v. Prewitt, 459 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, no
writ).
168. 162 Tex. 485, 348 S.W.2d 523 (1961).
169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58 (Vernon 1975) (formerly Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4636
(1925)).
170. See Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
171. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4637 (1925).
172. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 472, § 6, at 1189.
173. Tolbert v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 235, 223 S.W.2d 617 (1949); Red
River Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918).
174. Walling v. Hannig, 73 Tex. 580, I1 S.W. 547 (1889); Davenport v. Rutledge, 187
S.W. 988, 990 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
175. Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 491, 348 S.W.2d 523, 527 (1961); Moore v. Moore,
192 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1946, no writ).
176. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975) (derived from Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
4638 (1925)); see Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950).
177. 162 Tex. at 488, 348 S.W.2d at 525.
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deal with that liability prior to the final decree. The court clearly distin-
quished between a permissible interlocutory allowance of temporary sup-
port and an impermissible interlocutary division of property.178 The court
viewed an interim award of attorney's fees as an improper interlocutory
property division in the context of pre-1963 law. The 1963 statute giving
married women full contractual capacity and the 1969 enactment of sec-
tion 3.59 in terms of temporary spousal support completely changes the
factors underlying the Wallace decision and leaves that decision without
any rational underpinning. Today, attorney's fees pendente lite are com-
monly looked upon as an incident of support. 1 79 As the supreme court
recognized in Bounds v. Caudle'80 in a closely related context: major statu-
tory changes have invalidated the rationale for the old doctrine.
With respect to the general provisions concerning spousal support in
section 4.02,181 the 1979 amendment removes the double standard, but the
provision with respect to necessaries is unchanged. A recent federal deci-
sion applying Pennsylvania law 182 points the way to a significant reinter-
pretation of that section with respect to necessaries. There the court
interprets the equal rights amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution as
effectively redefining the concept of necessaries to include the wife's duty
to provide for the husband. 8 3 The Pennsylvania amendment is substan-
tially identical to that of Texas, 184 and this approach would achieve com-
plete parity in all aspects of section 4.02.
Spousal Liabilities. In Cooper v. Dalton85 a husband and wife were jointly
indebted to a department store. In their property settlement prior to di-
vorce it was agreed that the husband would discharge this obligation. On
his failure to do so, the store recovered a judgment against the ex-wife,
who subsequently brought suit against the husband for his breach of the
agreement. Judgment was entered for the ex-wife, and the husband ap-
pealed. The husband argued that if the wife's judgment against him were
allowed to stand, he might thereby be required to pay twice, since he was
still liable to the store. The appellate court concluded that the ex-husband
could protect himself against any double obligation by making the ex-wife
and the department store joint payees of his check to satisfy the judg-
178. Id. at 489, 348 S.W.2d at 526. The court cited Hendry v. Hendry, 238 S.W.2d 821
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1951, no writ), a case involving an award in the nature of tempo-
rary alimony for both spouses.
179. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1949, no writ).
180. 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1978).
181. Section 4.02 now reads:
Each spouse has the duty to support the other spouse, and each parent has the
duty to support his or her minor child. A spouse or parent who fails to dis-
charge the duty of support is liable to any person who provides necessaries to
those to whom support is owed.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
182. United States v. O'Neill, 478 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
183. Id. at 854.
184. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
185. 581 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
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ment. 186
Exempt Property. In In re Sisemore18 7 the Fort Worth Bankruptcy Court
construed the personal property exemption statute liberally to include a
jeep as well as an ordinary passenger automobile in favor of a bankrupt.
This decision was sustained by the federal district court and the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Taking this cue, the legislature amended article
3836(a)(3) 188 to exempt all passenger cars and light trucks, 189 provided
that these vehicles "are not held or used for production of income." 190 The
amendment then provides that the debtor may alternatively select any two
of the exempt categories of means of travel previously provided in article
3836(a)(3),191 "whether held or used for production of income or not."1 92
This legislative interjection of the concept of tools of trade into the alterna-
tive available under article 3836(a)(3) may preclude a claim of an addi-
tional vehicle as a tool of trade under article 3836(a)(2), as draftsmen of
that article originally intended. 193
In individual bankruptcy proceedings under the former bankruptcy law
a Colorado husband and wife were each allowed to claim exempt personal
property up to the maximum value allowed for "the head of a family."' 94
Although the same reasoning is inapplicable to the provisions of article
3836(a), 95 some of the same results are available to a Texas husband and
wife in bankruptcy. Each might claim up to $30,000 of solely managed
community personalty "for a family."' 96 Although the Colorado Constitu-
tion and the Colorado Supreme Court require liberal construction of ex-
emption statutes,197the Texas judicial tradition is equally strong in this
regard. 198
In spite of the liberality of Texas law in favor of a homestead claimant, it
is a fundamental principle that a homestead claim cannot be first asserted
186. Id. at 221-22.
187. Bk. No. 4-77-146 (Bk. Ct. N.D. Tex. May 25, 1978), afid, 602 F.2d 742 (5th Cir.
1979), discussed in McKnight, Family Law." Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
33 Sw. L.J. 99, 152 (1979) (suggesting a statutory amendment to exempt two automobiles).
188. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
189. The definition of "light trucks" and "passenger cars" in id. art. 6701d, §§ 2(b), (h),
(j), 4(a) (Vernon 1977) is controlling.
190. Id. art. 3836(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
191. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 588, § 3, at 1628.
192. TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
193. See McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and W!fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 152-53 (1979). In Sun Ltd. v. Casey, 96 Cal. App. 3d 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1979), the court held that an automobile used by a real estate agent to transport herself and
prospective buyers was an exempt "tool or an implement."
194. In re Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348, 350, 351 (D. Colo. 1979).
195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
196. See Pedlar, Community Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, I1 ST.
MARY's L.J. 349, 352-57, 360 (1979).
197. See Sandberg v. Borstadt, 48 Colo. 96, 109 P. 419 (1910).
198. See Gaddy v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 393, 399, 283 S.W. 472, 474 (1926). See
also Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 130 Tex. 186, 107 S.W.2d 994 (1937);
Rodgers v. Ferguson, 32 Tex. 533 (1870).
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on appeal in a dispute concerning wrongful seizure. 19 9 Further, although
the federal Bankruptcy Act recognizes state homestead exemptions for
bankruptcy purposes, it is equally fundamental that a state exemption law,
homestead or otherwise, will not protect the owner from enforcement of
debts owed to the federal sovereign. 2°° In Sears v. United States,20 after a
debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, a federal tax lien was fixed on his home-
stead in mid-1976 for pre-bankruptcy taxes. Since neither the bankruptcy
nor the discharge affects exempt property,20 2 the bankruptcy was irrelevant
to the validity of the tax lien on the homestead.
The constitutional prohibition against mortgaging a homestead to bor-
row money 20 3 is often circumvented by selling the homestead to a con-
trolled corporation, which, in turn, will mortgage the property but will
allow the seller to occupy the premises at little or no expense. When the
property is about to be foreclosed, the seller sometimes seeks the protection
of the further constitutional provision which provides that "pretended
sales of the homestead involving any condition of defeasance shall be
void." 2° 4 But no success can be expected from this argument unless there
is some showing of a "condition of defeasance. ' ' 20 5 Further, a third party
creditor who seeks to avoid a purported sale by his debtor by asserting that
it was an invalid mortgage and not a sale of the homestead has an equally
difficult case.20 6 It may also occasionally happen that the mortgagor of his
home will attempt to enforce his mortgage contract without asserting any
pretense of sale though the transaction was made as an apparent absolute
conveyance. In Scott v. Bishop20 7 a homeowner was successful in proving
an oral option to repurchase property upon repayment of an alleged loan
and argued, inter alia, that this method of borrowing money on a home-
stead had been prevalent since the early days of the Republic. 20 8 He
thereby turned historical reality to good account.
IV. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction and Venue. Both the courts20 9 and the legislature2 10 focused
199. Geiser v. Lawson, 584 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
200. See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913
(1963).
201. 474 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
202. Id. at 990. Bankruptcy Act of July 5, 1966, § 2, 80 Stat. 270.
203. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
204. Id.
205. See Eckard v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 588 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1979, no writ).
206. See H.D. Snow Housemoving, Inc. v. Moyers, 581 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
207. 581 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
208. Id. at 207.
209. Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ filed); But-
ler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ dism'd); Thornlow v.
Thomlow, 576 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Johnston v.
Johnston, 575 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Oubre v. Oubre,
575 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
210. During the 1979 session the Texas Legislature passed three amendments to TEX.
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attention on solving jurisdictional problems affecting disputes within the
parent-child relationship. No dispute at the appellate level called for judi-
cial analysis of the similar jurisdictional problems regarding adjudication
of title to, or division of, property that was subject to the control of a
spouse but not subject to the personal jurisdiction of a Texas divorce court.
In Fox v. Fox211 it was said that a court without in personam jurisdiction
has the power to divide property of a nondomiciliary within, but not
outside, Texas.212 Furthermore, judicial seizure of property within the
state will not subject the nondomiciliary to jurisdiction so that property
located elsewhere is also subject to the court's power. 213 It has always been
assumed that seizure of property within the state is unnecessary to adjudi-
cation of its character or to its division. Without seizing the property, how-
ever, the court would seem powerless to restrain the removal or disposition
of moveables, if the person having control of the property is beyond the
power of the court.
The appeal in Skubal v. Skuba1214 appears to stem from a misapprehen-
sion of the distinction between domicile and residence in relation to di-
vorce and the application of either concept to the situation of a
serviceman. Residence is a question of fact. Domicile, on the other hand,
is a conclusion of law with respect to one's permanent home. There are
many Texans around the world who regard Texas as their domicile and
who have maintained ties that demonstrate their intention to maintain it.
There are also many foreign nationals who now reside in Texas and regard
Texas as their domicile. There are still others whose stay here is one of
indefinite duration even though there is a very reasonable apprehension, as
in the case of servicemen, that the present situation is not permanent. A
serviceman may nevertheless maintain a domicile in Texas if he intends to
make Texas his home indefinitely or permanently. Therefore, if he sues in
Texas for divorce, he need not rely on section 3.23215 of the Family Code
FAM. CODE § 11.05(a): 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 584, § 1, at 1201, ch. 643, § 2, at 1471,
ch. 763, § I, at 1888 (Vernon); added two new §§ 11.05(e): 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch.
584, § 1, at 1201, ch. 763, § 2, at 1888 (Vernon); and amended § 11.06(d): Tex. Sess. Law
Serv., ch. 763, § 2, at 1888 (Vernon). These amendments to § 11.05(a) are tersely summa-
rized in 79-3 STATE BAR SECTION REPORT, FAMILY LAW, 25 (Fall 1979). The legislature
also added new §§ 11.052, 11.053: 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 584, §§ 3-4, at 1202-03
(Vernon). Section 11.052 codifies the results of Corliss v. Smith, 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1977, no writ), discussed in Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 425, 446 (1979), and disposes of the holding in Zeisler v. Zeisler, 553
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), discussed in Thomas, Conflict of Laws,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 387, 396-98 (1978).
211. 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
212. California's long-arm statute is broad enough to reach certain nonresident third per-
sons holding property of the spouses so that such property is effectively put within the power
of the California courts. See In re Bastian, 94 Cal. App. 3d 483, 156 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526-27
(1979). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 1000 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d
490 (1980).
213. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (semble).
214. 584 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ dism'd). See also Seiler v.
Seiler, No. 16081 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, June 20, 1979, no writ).
215. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975). In spite of Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex.
350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959), this provision seems of dubious constitutional validity. See
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in order to lay the jurisdictional basis for his suit.
Receivers and Masters. In 1965 the Texas legislature enacted art. 2338-
2b 216 empowering district and juvenile courts in Wichita County to ap-
point referees to whom the courts might refer matters concerning failure to
pay "child support, temporary alimony, or separate maintenance" 21 7 and
related matters. In 1975 a similar act 21 8 authorized the appointment of a
"full-time master" for such purposes in Dallas County, and in 1977 the
legislature authorized masters for like purposes in Harris County.21 9 Dur-
ing the legislative session of 1979 a further act 220 was passed that seems to
supplement and limit these earlier enactments and to authorize such ap-
pointments elsewhere as the county commissioners court may direct.221
But since the prior acts were not specifically referred to in the 1979 legisla-
tion, the appointment of masters under the earlier acts may be independ-
ent of the 1979 act.222 In any event, the act does not affect the appointment
and authority of masters in chancery under rule 171.223 The appointment
of either sort of master is not authorized in a jury case. 224
The appointment of a receiver is a drastic measure 225 in a divorce pro-
ceeding, and the receiver's activities are carefully circumscribed by law. In
Wood and Pullman, Inc. v. Wood 226 the husband's employer was ordered
to pay the husband's wages to a receiver for disbursement as temporary
alimony. Since this interlocutory order granted injunctive relief, it was ap-
pealable. 227 Since its effect was tantamount to garnishment of wages, in
violation of the Texas Constitution 228 and statute, 229 the order was set
aside.
In North Side Bank v. Wachendorfer23° the husband held record title to
McKnight, Commentary of the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 281, 326
(1974).
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-2b (Vernon 1971).
217. Id. § 2.
218. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-9b.2 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
219. Id. art. 2338-1d. The act does nor refer to Harris County specifically, but rather to
"a county of more than 1,500,000 population." Id. § l(a).
220. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 719, §§ 1-12, at 1771.
221. Id. §§ I(a), (b), (c).
222. There is only an oblique hint of interrelation between the most recent and the ear-
lier acts. Section 13 of the 1979 act provides that if a certain bill concerning Dallas County
should pass, the provision of the 1979 act wouldapply to the district courts in Dallas County.
The bill referred to was vetoed. The implication is that if that bill did not become law, as
was the case, the 1979 act would not apply to Dallas County.
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
224. Mann v. Mann, 592 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, writ filed) (rule 171
master); Garrison v. Garrison, 568 SW.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ)
(statutory master).
225. See Keton v. Clark, 67 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, writ reed).
226. 585 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
227. Id. at 762; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(d). A similar order in which the employer was
merely ordered to accumulate the wages of the employee was not appealed in Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
228. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
229. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966).
230. 585 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist. Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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certain realty that he had mortgaged to a bank by a deed of trust. In a
property settlement pursuant to a divorce, the court awarded a one-half
undivided interest in the land to the wife. Since the husband had de-
faulted on his note prior to the divorce, four days after entry of the divorce
decree the bank posted a notice for a trustee's sale under the deed of trust.
Asserting that she had not had proper notice of the sale, the ex-wife
promptly filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver of the property.
The court granted the motion at an ex parte hearing without notice to the
ex-husband, who then appealed. The appellate court held that the trial
court had violated the notice provisions of rule 695231 and had overlooked
the more appropriate and less drastic remedy of a temporary restraining
order.232 The appellate court further noted that article 2318233 specifically
provides that a receivership of property is not available to an owner of the
property against a creditor.
Finality of Judgment. The court's rendition of judgment is made either
orally or by filing a memorandum. The court thereby "pronounces its de-
cision and conclusions upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication."
The entry ofjudgment is the ministerial act that furnishes enduring evi-
dence of the judicial act of rendition.234 If the court does not determine all
the matters before it, however, the rendition or entry is merely interlocu-
tory. Appellate courts have discussed a number of troublesome applica-
tions of these principles in the last few years.235
Although the court's handling of the peculiar sequence of events that
occurred in Austin v. Austin 236 is instructive, the case is unlikely to have
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 695.
232. In this instance the trial court's order amounted to a temporary injunction, and TEX.
R. Civ. P. 681 had not been complied with since no notice had been given. The movant's
attorney had also overlooked the bond requirement in TEX. R. Civ. P. 684 that arises when a
third person is sought to be enjoined in a divorce proceeding. See Goodwin v. Goodwin,
456 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1970), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41 n.53 (1971). See also Couch Mortgage Co. v. Hughes, 536
S.W. 2d 70, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1976, no writ).
If a motion for continuance is granted to either party, that party must bear in mind that he
is not entitled to additional notice of trial under TEx. R. Civ. P. 245. Magana v. Magana,
576 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
233. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2318 (Vernon 1971).
234. Eastin v. Eastin, 588 S.W.2d 812, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ
dism'd). The principal difficulty with this formulation is that the term "rendition of judg-
ment" in TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b.5 has been sometimes thought to mean entry ofjudgment.
This confusion stems in part from the provision of TEx. R. Civ. P. 306a that "[i]n determin-
ing the periods within which the various steps of an appeal must be taken, the date of rendi-
tion of a judgment or order shall be deemed to be the date upon which the written draft
thereof was signed by the trial judge as stated therein." That rule goes on to provide, how-
ever, that "this rule shall not be construed as determining what constitutes rendition of a
judgment or order in any other situation or for any other purpose."
235. See McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 122-24 (1979); McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
TexasLaw, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 111,122-23 (1978); McKnight, Family Law." Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 110, 118 (1977).
236. 586 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ granted), on prior appeal, 553
S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ dism'd), commented on in McKnight, Family
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great precedential impact because of its unusual facts. At the first trial the
court considered the grounds for divorce and division of property and
made a brief docket entry. After the death of the wife three weeks later,
the trial court abated the proceeding. On the husband's appeal the appel-
late court held that, if the divorce was granted and if property division was
made, the wife's death was not a proper ground for abatement. The case
was therefore remanded to the trial court for a determination of the mean-
ing of the docket entry so that the trial court might enter a judgment grant-
ing or denying the divorce. In the meantime the trial judge had retired.
On remand to the trial court the new judge could not discover the meaning
of the docket entry.237 He therefore retried the case and granted a divorce.
On the second appeal, the court of civil appeals held that the evidence
addressed at the second trial was insufficient on which to ground a divorce
and reversed the trial court's judgment. 238 It should be noted that after the
first trial the judge could have vacated or modified his original orderfor
cause within thirty days under rule 329b.5; 239 cause, however, cannot be
the death of a party. The cause must relate to the grounds for divorce or
another circumstance arising prior to rendition of judgment. 240
In Kocman v. Kocman241 a vast lapse of time rather than a brief one
posed a problem of finality of judgment. The divorce court awarded a
house to the wife in its decree of divorce, and the husband filed a motion
for new trial four days later. Seven weeks later an agreed motion for con-
tinuance was filed and thereafter a hearing was had and a new trial or-
dered. Nothing further occurred until the wife filed her writ of possession
for the house four years later. The court concluded that rule 329b.3 and
.4242 caused the divorce judgment to become final forty-five days after the
husband's filing of his motion for new trial. Hence, the judgment had al-
ready become final before the motion for continuance, and the subsequent
order of the court was therefore irrelevant.
As a general rule, when a court fails to adjudicate all matters submitted
to it, its order is merely interlocutory and not final. This situation has
arisen in a number of instances when a court has purported to sever the
issues of divorce and property division.243 With respect to issues within
the parent-child relationship, a reservation of judgment on matters of con-
servatorship causes an order of divorce, initially rendered, to be interlocu-
Law. Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 109, 123 (1978). The
commentator somewhat misapprehended the appellate court's conclusion.
237. There is no indication that either party attempted to subpoena the retired judge in
order to enquire of him what the docket entry meant.
238. 586 S.W.2d at 942.
239. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.5.
240. See Verret v. Verret, 570 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, no
writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
33 Sw. L.J. 99, 123 (1979).
241. 581 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
242. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.3 &.4.
243. See McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32
Sw. L.J. 109, 111, 122-23 (1978). See also McKnight, Family Law- Husband and Wife An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 122-23 (1979).
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tory.244 In reaching the same conclusion in a recent case 245 the court
added that "no order of severance was entered. ' 246 The implication is that
the court might sever the suit affecting the parent-child relationship joined
with the divorce suit for trial under section 3.55.247
It was also recently concluded that a court order providing for sale of a
couple's property, for subsequent division of the proceeds by the court is
an interlocutory order and therefore not subject to appeal.248 If this rea-
soning is sound, it would also support an order to sell the homestead sub-
ject to the court's disposition of the proceeds, which might include the
payment of general debts and costs.249 The better course in a situation of
this type would be for the appellate court to consider the merits of the
division, including the purpose of the sale.
Motion for New Trial. In Brown v. Brown250 the Eastland court of civil
appeals reiterated the point that a defaulting party251 who fails to set up a
meritorious defense is not entitled to a new trial. More significantly, the
court also added its interpretaion of new rule 324:252
A motion for new trial shall not be a prerequisite to the right to com-
plain on appeal. . . and the omission of a point in such motion...
shall be necessary to file a motion for new trial in order to present a
complaint which has not otherwise been ruled upon.
The court disagreed with the conclusion of the El Paso court of civil ap-
peals253 that a complaint that a judgment is supported by insufficient evi-
dence or is against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence must
be assigned as error in a motion for new trial in a nonjury case.
[W]hen the court renders judgment it has "otherwise ruled upon" the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the controlling facts sustaining
the judgment. An appellant, however, must file a motion for new trial
in order to present a complaint which the record fails to disclose was
ruled upon by the court.254
In applying its interpretation of the rule, the Eastland court observed that,
in a default judgment case, the appellant cannot raise issues on appeal not
specified in the motion for new trial because those issues were not objected
244. Choate v. Choate, 576 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ);
Campbell v. Campbell, 550 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
245. Kelley v. Kelley, 583 S.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ
dism'd).
246. Id. at 673.
247. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.55(b) (Vernon 1975).
248. Treadway v. Treadway, 576 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ).
249. See Foster v. Foster, 583 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ)
(final order to sell homestead was not superseded and hence had become moot on appeal).
See also Poston v. Poston, 572 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978,
no writ).
250. Brown v. Brown, 590 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
251. In Brown the husband had answered but failed to appear at the trial.
252. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324 (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
253. Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
254. 590 S.W.2d at 811.
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to at the trial and were hence not ruled upon.255
In Grffth v. Grflth256 the most the appellant-husband could have ex-
pected was a new trial, since he had specifically waived the presence of a
court reporter and therefore came to the appellate court without an ade-
quate statement of facts. After entry of the judgment the appellant had
requested findings of facts and conclusions of law, which were filed. The
husband then sought further findings, but the trial court did not respond to
this request. On appeal the husband asserted that the refusal of his request
constituted error. The appellate court was unsympathetic to his plea. Jus-
tice Keith added some advice to cover this sort of dilemma, 257 but the
judge's citations258 do not suggest a solution. What the justice may have
been suggesting obliquely was greater diligence and diplomacy in the en-
deavor. But neither course can rectify the initial foolhardiness of declining
the presence of the court reporter.
Appeal. An appeal bond must be filed within thirty days of the judg-
ment. 25 9 The delay in ruling on a pauper's affidavit in lieu of a bond does
not extend the time for filing the bond.260 If it is shown that the ruling
contesting the affidavit constituted an abuse of discretion, the appeal may
proceed. 261
An appeal may be precluded if the appellant disobeys the court's or-
der.262 In Goodridge v. Goodridge263 the husband-appellant had violated
the trial court's order by selling property awarded to the wife. The wife's
motion to dismiss the husband's appeal was nevertheless denied. It was
pointed out that the wife had conceded she had adequate remedies to pro-
tect her property or to recover its value.264 Although the husband should
have had an opportunity to explain his flouting of the court's award, the
doors of the appellate court should not be open to one who deliberately
disregards a judicial order without good cause.
As a general proposition, the acceptance of benefits of a decree is a bar
to an appeal from that decree. 265 There are certain exceptions to this rule,
255. Id.
256. 584 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
257. Id. at 499-500.
258. Stronck v. Stronck, 538 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
259. TEX. R. Civ. P. 356(a).
260. King v. Payne, 156 Tex. 105, 113-14, 292 S.W.2d 331, 334-35 (1956).
261. Talley v. Talley, 587 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ
dism'd).
262. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gunning, 572 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1978, no writ) (conservatorship case). In Coplin v. Coplin, 579 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ), the court brushed aside allegations of disobedience of the
trial court's order with the observation that the issue was one for the trial court, rather than
the apellate court, to decide.
263. 591 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
264. Prompt recordation of the judgment in the records of the county where the realty
was situated would have also given a prospective purchaser notice.
265. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950). For a recent in-
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however. The use of benefits to satisfy financial needs is one exception. 266
Another is the acceptance of a benefit that the appellee concedes or must
concede to be due the appellant.267 In Kidd v. Kidd268 the homestead had
been sold by order of the court, and after payment of debts due on the
property the proceeds were ordered divided equally between the spouses.
The appellee asserted that the appellant was barred from his appeal by
acceptance of this benefit. Since that aspect of division was independent of
others in issue on appeal, however, the court treated the case as falling
within the exception of a conceded benefit.269 Yet another exception may
be labelled with the maxim de minimis non curat lex.270
Equitable Bill of Review. In Turner v. Turner271 the ex-husband filed his
bill of review to set aside a property settlement agreement that had been
incorporated into a decree of divorce. The respondent countered by the
unusual ploy of praying that the petitioner show cause why his bill of re-
view should not be denied. The court accordingly ordered the ex-husband
to appear for that purpose and at the end of the hearing entered a judg-
ment on the merits. The appellate court turned aside this irregular form of
proceeding and remanded the cause to the trial court.272
Other bills of review proceedings were more prosaic in that essential
elements for granting the bill either went unalleged 273 or unproved. 274 In
Hamborsky v. Hamborsky,275 however, the ex-wife's bill of review turned
on an alleged fraudulent conveyance of community realty by the ex-hus-
band prior to the filing of the petition for divorce. Such fraud, however, is
intrinsic, whereas proof of extrinsic fraud is necessary to sustain a bill of
review. 276 In a recent California case277 the court held that a corporate
director-husband was under no duty, in either his capacity as director or
husband, to inform his wife during divorce proceedings that the corpora-
tion, whose stock was held by the community, contemplated a public offer-
stance, see Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no
writ) (alternative ground for court's conclusion).
266. See McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wtfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 127-28 (1979). See also Coplin v. Coplin, 579 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
267. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).
268. 584 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
269. Id. at 554-55.
270. See Coplin v. Coplin, 579 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
271. 576 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1978, no writ).
272. Id. at 454.
273. Carroll v. Carroll, 580 S.W.2d 410, 412-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.]
1979, no writ).
274. Northcutt v. Jarrett, 585 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979), writ re'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 592 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. 1979). The Texas Supreme Court there took the
opportunity to disapprove the holding in Deen v. Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1975, no writ), that a lack of negligence need not be proved when a waiver of
process is invalidly executed.
275. 584 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
276. Id. at 332.
277. In re Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979).
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ing that might greatly increase the stock's value. 278 Such withholding of
information was therefore not fraudulent; but even if fraudulent, it would
have been intrinsically fraudulent and hence not of the sort that would
ground a bill of review.
V. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Property Settlement Agreements. In addition to the immediate objective of
the division of property, two further goals are of utmost importance in
drafting property settlement agreements. The instrument must not only
provide for favorable tax treatment279 but must also be developed so that
the terms of the agreement will not be adversely affected by the rules of
state law. Although a settlement agreement need not be incorporated in
the divorce decree to be enforceable, 280 the agreement may be so incorpo-
rated. 28' If the agreement is made a part of the decree, it stands as an
agreed judgment and "is accorded the same degree of finality and binding
force as a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of adversary proceed-
ing.,, 282 Thus the terms of the settlement are merged in the judgment and
278. 591 P.2d at 916, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
279. See Schaer v. Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 1145; Cason, TaxAspects of Di-
vorces and Separations, 42 TEX. L.J. 1012 (1979); cf Saniewski v. Commissioner, 1979
T.C.M. (P-H) 1244; Karageorgevitch v. Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 962; Alexander v.
Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 927. See also Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 333
(1979). In Siewert the property settlement agreement provided that the husband should re-
ceive substantially more than one-half of the community property. The wife was to be paid
a substantial sum of money under the agreement. The court treated part of this transaction
as a taxable sale rather than as an equal division of property. In so concluding, the court
decided that a large bank loan negotiated by the husband a few hours before the divorce in
order to pay a lump sum to the wife did not constitute a community liability. The husband
had not specified that the notes were community liabilities and "the bank expected them to
be paid by [the husband] not the community." Id. at 335-36. But if the husband had become
insolvent prior to the payment of the note, the bank could have relied on the presumption of
community liability in order to attempt to recover the unpaid balance from the community
assets transferred to the wife. See Boyd v. Ghent, 93 Tex. 543 547, 57 S.W. 5, 6-7 (1900);
Dean v. First Nat'l Bank, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e);
First Nat'l Bank v. Hickman, 89 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ ref'd);
Grandjean v. Runke, 39 S.W. 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ). The husband was
successful, however, in arguing that a bank-overdraft that he negotiated shortly before the
divorce in order to purchase an annuity for the wife was a community liability. 72 T.C. at
336.
280. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967). In Damstra v. Starr, 585 S.W.2d 817
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ), the ex-husband was dissatisfied with a bargain
he and his wife had struck in their property settlement on divorce. In order to buy the wife's
community interest in his accounts receiveable and assets on hand, the husband executed a
note to her and, following the divorce, made payments on the note. When he discovered
that his accounts receiveable were not as valuable as he had earlier believed and that his
payments on the note were not deductible under the federal income tax laws, he attempted
to cancel the note and to recover payments made. The court determined that neither an
error in predicting a future fact nor a mistake of law will relieve a party from his contract.
Id. at 820.
281. A court should not, of course, enter judgment on the basis of a property agreement
if the arrangement has not been assented to by both spouses. Eastin v. Eastin, 588 S.W.2d
812, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
282. Exparte Gorena, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 32, 33 (Oct. 17, 1979) (quoting McCray v.
McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979)). Gorena did not, however, involve an agreement
to pay contractual alimony. The court's general conclusion in Gorena and McCray seems to
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any contractual defenses that might have been raised concerning enforce-
ability are no longer available. 28 3 If the settlement agreement contains
contractual alimony provisions, however, its approval by the court or its
incorporation in the decree does not change its contractual quality, be-
cause it is beyond the court's power to order the payment of permanent
alimony.28 4
A property settlement agreement may furnish a contractual basis for en-
forcement by a third party beneficiary. In Stegall v. StegalP85 an adult son
recovered the amount of college tuition and fees that the father had failed
to provide pursuant to a separation agreement. The property settlement
agreement at issue in Pitts v. Ashcraft286 contained a noncompetition
agreement providing that the former wife would not engage, nor en-
courage anyone to engage, in the funeral business. Alleging third party
beneficiary status, the husband's family's funeral corporation failed to es-
tablish a breach of the covenant even though the wife had made cash gifts
to her son, who subsequently entered that business. 287
Power to Divide Separate Personally. While the Texarkana court of civil
appeals has asserted that title to community property cannot be divested
from parents to their children,288 eight courts of civil appeals 289 have now
held that Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer290 is to be read as applying to separate
realty only and that divorce courts may divest the separate personalty from
one spouse in favor of the other. During the past year six new holdings29'
and one hearty dictum 292 were added to the catalogue of authorities sup-
porting this proposition.293
In one of these cases, Spencer v. Spencer,294 the husband had begun to
accumulate retirement rights when he entered military service in 1935.
abrogate the rule that a consent judgment may not be modified except by consent. Mikeska
v. Mikeska, 584 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (citing
Boyd v. Boyd, 545 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ)).
283. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 33 (citing Peddicord v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
284. McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979).
285. 571 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
286. 586 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
287. Id. at 693-94.
288. Treadway v. Treadway, 576 S.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,
no writ) (dictum).
289. The courts in Fort Worth, Dallas, Texarkana, El Paso, Beaumont, Waco, Eastland,
and Tyler support this proposition, and none oppose it. There has not been a dissenting
judge in any of these cases.
290. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
291. Brown v. Brown, 590 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ);
Spencer v. Spencer, 589 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ); Campbell
v. Campbell, 586 S.W.2d 162, 166-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ granted); In re
Trujillo, 580 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ); York v. York, 579
S.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ); Crowell v. Crowell, 578
S.W.2d 562, 564-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
292. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
293. For a discussion of previous reactions to Eggemeyer, see McKnight, Family Law.-
Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 133 n.273 (1979).
294. Spencer v. Spencer, 589 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
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The couple was married in 1948. On his retirement in 1957 the husband
began receiving retirement benefits that would have been then character-
ized as fractionally divisible in community and separate shares. When the
couple was divorced in 1959 the judgment was silent as to the pension
benefits, and each thereafter held the community share of benefits as ten-
ants in common of separate property. The ownership interest in the bene-
fits was unaffected by the couple's remarriage in 1960. As a result of their
subsequent divorce in 1978, the trial court awarded the wife's separate in-
terest in the husband's retirement benefits to the husband. On appeal, the
division was held to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 295 Although
separate personalty of the wife might be awarded to the husband under
some circumstances, it was not appropriate in this situation in which the
equities very much favored the wife. In attempting to refute the wife's
separate interest, the husband asserted that the wife's claim had been
barred by the statute of limitation because of her failure to exercise her
right for nearly twenty years. The court, however, found no indication of
repudiation of the wife's right by the husband, and the statute of limitation
can only begin to run against one cotenant when the other cotenant gives
notice of a repudiation of the cotenancy. 2
96
Reimbursement.297 In Swearingen v. Swearingen298 the doctrine of reim-
bursement appears to have been used inappropriately to circumvent the
rule against divestiture of separate realty enunciated in Eggemeyer. The
facts in Swearingen reveal only that a down payment of $6,000 on a home
purchased during the marriage was made from the husband's separate
property. The divorce judgment allowed the husband reimbursement for
his down payment. On appeal, he claimed unsuccessfully that the court
wrongly divested him of his separate realty. If the purchase was made
wholly on credit or by giving a community note, and if a first payment was
made on the indebtedness with the husband's $6,000, there can be no criti-
cism of the court's conclusion. If, on the other hand, the home was
purchased with a down payment of part of the purchase price and the re-
mainder was supplied by a community note, the separate estate of the hus-
band and the community would own the home as -tenants in common in
proportionate shares under the inception of title doctrine. 299 Hence reim-
bursement of a part of the purchase price would constitute divestiture of
separate title to realty.
295. Id. at 176.
296. Id. Indeed, it would be very difficult to make a factual showing of sufficient repudi-
ation of a separate claim to either personalty or realty by either spouse while the couple is
living together.
297. For a general analysis of the law of reimbursement, see McKnight, Is There a Right
of Reimbursement in Texas, in MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION IN TEXAS ch. C (State Bar of
Texas 1979); McKnight, Reimbursement Between Marital Estates on Marriage Dissolution and
Partition in ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE ch. D (State Bar of Texas 1979).
298. 578 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
299. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6
(1851).
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It is asserted from time to time that the expenditure of community funds
to pay ad valorem taxes on separate property should be reimbursed to the
community.3°° The assertion is misdirected if the property is productive of
community income or other community enjoyment. If income exceeds ex-
penses, including taxes, those expenses properly fall on the community.30
In Schecter v. Schecter30 2 principles of reimbursement were utilized in
several contexts. Evaluating the property division very broadly, the appel-
late court saw reimbursement claims of the community against the wife's
separate estate and those of the wife's separate estate against the commu-
nity as cancelling each other out. The court also applied the rationale of
Schmidt v. Huffman303 to restore to the wife the value of the inventory of
her separate mercantile business as of the time of marriage. In Schmidt
the husband's business inventory at the time of marriage had been restored
to his estate at his death. Less evidence of disposition of the separate prop-
erty was required in Schecter than in Schmidt, but the equitable standards
of division on divorce allow a greater breadth of discretion than do the
standards used in cases of succession. 3°4 In the general context of reim-
bursement, Schmidt and Schecter are examples of restitution of separate
property in return for capital contributions to the well-being of the family.
This concept may be used by courts with increased frequency.30 5
Exercise of Discretion. Because the divorce court is granted wide discre-
tion in dividing the marital property, a claimant often finds it difficult to
show any abuse of discretion on appeal. 306 Trial courts may apply a vari-
300. Maben v. Maben, 574 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
301. Cadwell v. Dabney, 208 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948, writ refd
n.r.e.); Ames v. Ames, 188 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1945, no writ).
302. 579 S.W.2d 502, 505-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
303. 73 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889). See also Blumer v. Kallison, 297 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
304. In Schecier the husband asserted that the wife did not trace the inventory from the
beginning of the marriage to the end. The court indicated that the requirement of strict
tracing is more appropriate in instances involving debtor-creditor relations. If, for example,
a community creditor of the other spouse levies execution on a stock of merchandise of what
has been a jointly operated separate proprietorship, the owner-spouse must prove that the
assets in question are separate by applying strict tracing principles. Hardee v. Vincent, 136
Tex. 99, 147 S.W.2d 1072 (1941); Middlebrook v. Zapp, 73 Tex. 29, 10 S.W. 732 (1889);
Jones v. Epperson, 69 Tex. 586, 7 S.W. 488 (1889). The court properly distinguishes the facts
in Schecier from the debtor-creditor cases, because reimbursement does not reflect owner-
ship tracing principles but rather those of indebtedness.
305. For other recent examples, see Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 916-17 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd). Earlier instances include Hartman v. Hartman, 253
S.W.2d 480, 482-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, no writ); Farrow v. Farrow, 238 S.W.2d
255, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1951, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Hickman, 89 S.W.2d
838, 840-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ ref'd) (semble); Moor v. Moor, 57 S.W. 992
(Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ), reprintedat 255 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
306. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 587 S.W.2d 513, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, no writ) (testimony as to the value of significant properties was insufficient to show an
abuse of discretion); Foster v. Foster, 583 S.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
no writ) (although the total amount of assets awarded to the husband greatly exceeded the
amount awarded to the wife, the disparity resulted from the award to the husband of the
community homestead that he was ordered to sell in order to pay community debts; there-
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ety of standards, but the circumstances of particular cases are so diverse
that an objective analysis of results would be very difficult to formulate.30 7
There are, however, some recurring themes. If partition in kind is not pos-
sible, the court will usually order sale of community property in order to
achieve a division.30 8 If there are minor children for whom a home must
be provided, however, the court will not ordinarily order sale of the family
home.30 9 If a sale of the home is ordered and the objecting spouse fails to
supersede the judgment pending appeal, the appeal may be for naught.310
Rather than ordering a sale of a going business, a divorce court may award
the spouses undivided shares, but such a resolution is extremely rare.31' It
is sometimes stated as a justification for rejecting an appeal for abuse of
discretion that the appellant received more than one-half of the commu-
nity estate. 312 Although this may be classified as an objective standard, its
application does not constitute a sufficient review of the exercise of judicial
discretion.
Foreign Really. Texas courts do not assert the power to divide foreign
realty in a divorce context. 313 California courts, on the other hand, assert
the power both to characterize and to dispose of foreign realty when those
issues are submitted by the parties. 314 Relying upon the fact that a Florida
divorce court had conclusively determined the husband's ownership of
Pennsylvania realty, a Florida appellate court has concluded that the ex-
wife could not pursue her claims to the realty in a Pennsylvania court.315
A federal court sitting in Pennsylvania has agreed that the petitioning wife
is now precluded from asserting claims to the Pennsylvania land that could
have been maintained in the Florida court.316 Heretofore only one Texas
appellate case317 (and that one unreported 318) stood for the proposition
fore an abuse of discretion was not shown); Hammonds v. Hammonds, 583 S.W.2d 807, 809-
10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (the respective values of properties divided were
not shown; hence the court could not determine whether there had been an abuse of discre-
tion).
307. See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413, 433-44 (1976), for a discussion of criteria and standards. See also Karnezis, Fault as
Consideration in Alimony, Spousal Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault
Divorce, 86 A.L.R. 3d 1116 (1978).
308. Hammonds v. Hammonds, 583 S.W.2d 807, 808-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979,
writ dism'd).
309. Maben v. Maben, 574 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
310. Foster v. Foster, 583 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
311. See, e.g., In re Trujillo, 580 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no
writ); Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
dism'd); Flournoy v. Flournoy, 315 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, no
writ); Brown v. Brown, 191 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ).
312. Schecter v. Schecter, 579 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ);
Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd).
313. Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ).
314. See Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606 F.2d 285, 288-89 (10th Cir. 1979).
315. Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Simon v. Simon, 317
So.2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
316. Simon v. Simon, 478 F. Supp. 548, 550-51 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
317. Lopez v. Lopez, No. 15,788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, April 20, 1977, no writ).
318. It is nonetheless available on LEXIS.
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that a divorce court might order a party to convey foreign realty acquired
with community funds in order to achieve an equitable division of the
marital estate. In quick succession two appellate cases have dealt with the
courts' power to order a party subject to its in personam jurisdiction to
dispose of foreign realty. In one319 the property had been acquired with
community funds. In the other the wife had purported to convey a partial
interest in her separate property to her husband.3 20 In another instance32'
a Texas court upheld the disposition of a note secured by a mortgage of
foreign realty.
Attorney's Fees. An award of attorney's fees is in the discretion of the trial
court in dividing the marital estate and making an equitable apportion-
ment of the responsibility for their liabilities.3 22 The court may assess an
attorney's fee even when a jury advises against doing so. 32 3 A court may
also award attorney's fees pursuant to an agreement providing for attor-
ney's fees when either party has to seek judicial enforcement of the agree-
ment.324 In In re Neidert325 the trial court ordered that both parties
execute the documents necessary for the sale of certain realty. Four
months later the ex-wife brought a motion to have the husband found in
contempt for failure to execute the required instruments. The husband
thereupon executed the documents and was therefore not found in con-
tempt, but the attorney's fee and costs incurred in bringing the contempt
proceeding were assessed against his share of the proceeds. On appeal, the
order to pay attorney's fees and costs was reversed as constituting a pen-
alty.
In Paugh v. Paugh326 the appellate court pointed out that "attorney's
fees should be reasonable under the circumstances of [each] case on its
own merits, and should bear some reasonable relationship to the amount
319. Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
320. Brown v. Brown, 590 S.W.2d 808, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
Purporting to apply Texas law to the transaction before it, the appellate court erroneously
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the wife could not transform her California sepa-
rate realty into a joint tenancy between her and her husband. See Davis v. East Tex. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 163 Tex. 361, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962). In affirming the trial court's order requir-
ing the husband to execute a conveyance of his interest in the property to his wife, the
appellate court deleted that part of the court's order divesting the husband's title to the
California land. 590 S.W.2d at 813.
321. Campbell v. Campbell, 586 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979,
writ granted on another issue).
322. For a general discussion of attorney's fees, see McKnight, Division of Texas Marital
Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 455-61 (1976). See also McKnight, Famiy Law-
Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 121 (1977).
323. Reyna v. Reyna, 584 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979,
no writ) (modification of conservatorship).
324. Stegall v. Stegall, 571 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
Attorney's fees were awarded in connection with enforcement of a property settlement
agreement in accordance with its terms. Compare Damstra v. Starr, 585 S.W.2d 817, 821
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writl), with respect to attorney's fees and costs.
325. 583 S.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
326. 579 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
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in controversy. ' 327 The circumstances of this case revealed that the hus-
band had a net monthly income of $1,580, owned one car, and was the
conservator of two minor sons by a previous marriage. He had no income
producing property and no savings. The wife was, at that time, not able to
work. The home awarded to the wife was subject to a lien requiring pay-
ment of $464 a month, and her monthly car payments were $204. The trial
court had ordered the husband to pay child support in the amount of $500
a month and attorney's fees of $2,500. Because the appellate court con-
cluded that the attorney's fees were excessive, a remittitur of $1,000 was
ordered. Although the appellate court did not indicate either the amount
of time required to prepare the case or the difficulty of the issues involved,
the results illustrate the adage that small cases with big problems are un-
remunerative to counsel involved.328
Division After Divorce. If the trial court commits judicial error by wrongly
characterizing marital property and dividing it accordingly, a litigant's re-
course is to attack the decree directly.329 It is sometimes difficult, however,
to determine whether the court made a final division of particular prop-
erty.330 If community property is not divided, it becomes a tenancy in
common upon divorce. 331 In Yeo v. Yeo 332 the spouses' property settle-
ment agreement was incorporated in the decree divorcing them in 1964.333
The agreement provided that the wife released to the husband "all other
property of whatever nature, separate or community, in his possession or
claimed by him, and wherever located. ' 334 Although there was conflicting
testimony as to whether the husband's military retirement benefits were in
the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the agreement, the
court held on the basis of prior judicial precedents that the language of
possession and claim did not refer to the retirement interest. 335 The court
went on to conclude that "unless the property involved is specifically iden-
tified and described, comprehensive release clauses are not effective to
327. Id. at 40.
328. This is a paraphrase of Justice Keith's remarks in Smith v. Smith, 535 S.W.2d 380,
381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976).
329. See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 576 S.W.2d 664, 665-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978,
no writ). The substantive question in this case was whether renewal commissions from the
sale of life insurance policies during marriage were community property even though the
commissions were received by the husband after the divorce.
330. See, e.g., Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1976) (statement in court
order of fact that the husband received $220 a month in retirement benefits and that none of
these benefits were being awarded to the wife was sufficient to decree ownership in the hus-
band).
331. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
332. 581 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
333. The settlement was entered into long before either Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551
(Tex. 1970), or Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), was decided. In Busby the
court concluded that an accrued (vested) pension interest constituted community property.
The court admonished counsel to so advise trial judges. 457 S.W.2d at 555. In Cearley the
court held that unaccrued pension interests were subject to division on divorce. 544 S.W.2d
at 663-66.
334. Id. at 737.
335. 581 S.W.2d at 738-39.
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transfer or release property .... ",336 This statement seems too broad. If
parties make an informed and intended release of unknown or unidenti-
fied property and that release is not actuated by the fraud of one of them, it
should operate effectively to include all property not specifically identified.
In Matthews v. Houtchens337 the divorce decree had stated that there was
no community property to divide. Although this was clearly an erroneous
conclusion of the trial court, the appellate court held that this recital did
not stand as an adjudication that the retirement benefits at issue were the
separate property of the husband. 338 Because the retirement benefits were
not included in the divorce decree, title to them did not vest solely in either
husband or wife. Instead, the two became co-tenants of the property. 339
When a direct attack to challenge the existence of a tenancy in common
cannot be mounted by appeal or writ of error, an ex-spouse may attempt to
set aside the judgment by bill of review so that a discretionary division can
be achieved. If that approach is also unavailable, a partition of the co-
tenancy should be sought. 34° The ultimate barrier to partition is a statute
of limitation, but the limitation period will not begin to run with respect to
the co-tenancy of retirement benefits until there is a repudiation of the co-
tenant's rights after the payments have begun to be received. 34'
In the aftermath of divorce, necessary changes in the fire insurance pol-
icy on the home occupied by the still-united family constituents may be
overlooked with disastrous results. In Duren v. US Fire Insurance CO.342
the policy provided the company would not be liable for loss following a
change of ownership of the insured property unless the company was noti-
fied of the change in writing. In the divorce decree the community home
was awarded to the husband, and several years later he conveyed it to his
ex-wife who had lived in it with their children. After the home was se-
verely damaged by fire, the insurance policy was unenforceable because its
terms had not been complied with.
Enforcement. When a court awards a money judgment or orders one ex-
spouse to pay the other a monetary amount over a period of time but the
ex-spouse falls into arrears, execution may be had on a judgment in de-
336. Id. at 739.
337. 576 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
338. Id. at 883. The recitation in a divorce decree that no community property had been
acquired is not res judicata to prevent a partition of property not dealt with by the divorce
court. Clendenin v. Krock, 527 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ) (citing Harkness v. McQueen, 207 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947,
no writ)).
339. 576 S.W.2d at 883.
340. See, e.g., Hamborsky v. Hamborsky, 584 S.W.2d 330, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1979, no writ).
341. See Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no
writ); Cruse v. Cruse, 572 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, writ
ref d n.r.e.). See McKnight, Family Law. Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
33 Sw. L.J. 99, 141-42 (1979), for a discussion of Cruse. See notes 294-96 supra and accom-
panying text for another example of lack of repudiation of a cotenant's interest.
342. 579 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
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fault343 or arrears may be reduced to judgment followed by execution. 344
If the parties merely enter into a contractual undertaking that one will pay
the other a monetary amount, the breach must be reduced to judgment.
The doctrine of anticipatory breach is applicable to such a contractual
breach. 345 There is some authority for the proposition that this doctrine is
applicable even if the contract is incorporated in, and hence merged into,
the judgment. 346 In those instances when the funds of the delinquent party
are in the hands of a third person, garnishment may be sought. For pur-
pose of garnishment, military retirement benefits are not exempt from
seizure as current wages, 347 but garnishment of the United States is not
likely to be available to satisfy awards that a Texas divorce court might
make other than for child support. 348 When ex-spouses have sought to
reach retirement benefits in the hands of various third persons, they have
been met with the argument that the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 349 preempts recovery. The Waco court of
civil appeals has followed 350 the great weight of authority in rejecting this
argument.35'
The most commonly sought remedy for the enforcement of judicial or-
ders is the exercise of the court's contempt powers. 352 Although reliance is
usually had on a written order to do or refrain from doing an act pendente
lite or after judgment, an oral order of which an alleged contemnor has
specific knowledge may be subject to enforcement by contempt. 353 Recent
instances in which contempt powers have been invoked include the viola-
tion of an order to sign documents and deliver them personally to the other
343. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1979) provides that all
judgments bear interest at 9% from the date of judgment. A judgment for attorney's fees
bears the same interest. Poston v. Poston, 572 S.W.2d 800, 803-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
344. See, e.g., Wiley v. Wiley, 576 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
345. Chavez v. Chavez, 577 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
346. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 107-08
(1975), for a discussion of cases dealing with contractual child support.
347. Wagar v. United States, 582 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no
writ); United States v. Miranda, 581 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no
writ).
348. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 99, 135-36 (1979), for a discussion of garnishment.
349. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144 (1976)).
350. General Dynamics Corp. v. Harris, 581 S.W.2d 300, 303-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1979, no writ).
351. See, e.g., Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Merry 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Senco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D.
Fla. 1979); Operating Eng'rs Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 470 F. Supp.
1174 (D. Ariz. 1979); In re Pilatti, 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1979); In re
Bastian, 94 Cal. App. 3d 483, 156 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979); In re Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 13,
152 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1979); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 396 A.2d 365 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978). Contra, General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
352. For a general, current treatment of the subject, see Rasor & Koons, Drafting and
Enforcement by Contempt of Divorce Decrees, in MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION IN TEXAS ch. D
(State Bar of Texas 1979).
353. Exparte Barnes, 581 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979) (dictum).
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party,354 the failure to obey orders prohibiting the contemnor from inter-
fering with a receiver's collecting money, 355 and noncompliance with a di-
rection to pay a portion of retirement benefits to the ex-spouse as they were
received. 356 The principal barrier to enforcement of citations for contempt
is the lack of specificity in the orders. All too often the alleged contemnor
had not been told precisely what to do or not to do. When challenged by
writs of habeas corpus, the orders frequently fall short of the high standard
of particularity required under the circumstances. 357
There has been a great variety of opinion with respect to the constitu-
tionality of civil contempt orders issued for failure to pay a monetary
amount.358 Some have condemned all such orders (apart from those made
for the support of children), whether payment is ordered to third persons
or to the other spouse to achieve an equitable property division.359 The
Supreme Court of Texas, however, has condoned the use of the contempt
power to enforce the division of a community interest from a particular
fund of money360 or from retirement benefits as they are paid.36' In the
former instance, payment was to be made directly to the former spouse; in
the latter, to the registry of the court, but on similar facts a court of civil
appeals has enforced coercion to pay the former spouse directly. 362 Per-
missibility of contempt orders in these instances is said to rest on the pen-
sioner's status as a constructive trustee.363
Within the last few years, a number of courts of civil appeals have devel-
oped the concept that if money is ordered to be paid over a period of time
from a fund not in existence when the order was made, disobedience of the
order is not contemptible. 364 This view stems in large measure from the
354. Exparte Choate, 582 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979) (order to sign
instruments); Exparte McKinley, 578 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston, [ist Dist.]
1979) (order to execute promissory note and deed of trust); Exparte Trick, 576 S.W.2d 437
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (order to sign listing agreement for sale of
home and to deliver coin collection). Because some attorneys have occasionally erred in
filing a writ of error in response to an unsuccessful writ of habeas corpus in a court of civil
appeals, and there are, therefore, a few habeas corpus cases marked "writ of error dis-
missed," it is perhaps worth commenting that habeas corpus cases do not properly have writ
of error histories and hence do not require such notations.
355. Exparte Benitez, 590 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1979).
356. Exparte Turner, 584 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979).
357. Exparte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967). There the court stated:
It is an accepted rule of law that for a person to be held in contempt for dis-
obeying a court decree, the decree must spell out the details of compliance in
clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know
exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him.
Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
358. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18 forbids imprisonment for debt.
359. Exparle Roberts, 584 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
360. Exparte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 384, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (1961) (husband or-
dered to turn over money received from sale of property).
361. Exparte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1975).
362. Exparte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976).
363. The unstated rationale of this approach seems to be that the consequences of an
equitable relationship permit an equitable remedy.
364. See, e.g., Exparte Jackson, 590 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979)
(payment to be made to the other spouse for liabilities discharged and to be discharged "in
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supreme court's opinion in Exparte Yates.365 There the husband held a
promissory note that evidenced a substantial debt from a third person.
The divorce court awarded the wife one-half of the amount owed, ordered
the husband to pay her $500 a month to redeem the note, and further or-
dered the husband to deliver the note to the wife as security for his pay-
ment to her. The Texas Supreme Court held that because the wife was, in
effect, awarded a money judgment that the husband was to pay from his
future "earnings," the order could not be enforced by contempt.366 To do
so would be to imprison the husband for debt in violation of the Texas
Constitution. The language of the order was also imprecise and ambigu-
ous. This holding should not be generalized to mean that any order to
make periodic payments of money, except in a constructive trust situation,
is thereby rendered unenforceable by contempt. Even if one accepts the
argument that it is improper to order payment from a fund not yet in hand
because it lacks a tangible referent, it does not follow that all orders to
make periodic, monetary payments to achieve an equitable division of the
marital estate on divorce are invalid. If the fund to be divided is amply
identied and a spouse is ordered to pay a total amount that does not ex-
ceed the amount of the other spouse's share of the fund, the source of the
actual dollars paid should be irrelevant.367 A significant rationalization of
principles and results would be accomplished if that much of the argument
is accepted. Although only a few more converts can be expected beyond
this point, the argument will be carried a step further. An order to pay
particular debts to third persons from this identied fund should also be
enforceable by contempt. Because a division of the fund is the object of
the court, whether the debts are owed for an attorney's fee or for a liability
to the other spouse should be irrelevant. Although it has been consistently
held that contempt will not lie for the enforcement of an attorney's fee in
matters of divorce, 368 except for fees incurred in connection with child sup-
port and conservatorship, 369enforcement by citation for contempt should
be available for an order to pay such debts as an integral part of the divi-
sion of an identified fund.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the courts of civil appeals have con-
current jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to dissolve restraints on
order to balance the equities"; the source of payments was not identified); Exparle Neff, 542
S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976) (payment to be made from unspecific funds
to the other spouse); Exparte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list
Dist.] 1970) (dictum concerning a hypothetical order to pay a third person a debt owed).
365. 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965).
366. Id. at 380.
367. See, e.g., Kidd v. Kidd, 584 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no
writ). There the discussion centered on the refutation of the argument that periodic pay-
ments ordered by the court were alimony. There was no discussion of contempt. But the
situation is one in which the payments were closely tied to a division of community property,
clearly identified, on which a lien was placed for the discharge of the payments.
368. Exparle Choate, 582 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979); Exparte
Werner, 496 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973) (semble).
369. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(a) (Vernon 1975); Exparte McManus, 589 S.W.2d
790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979). But see Exparte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1971).
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liberty arising from divorce, spousal and child support, and child conser-
vatorship cases.370 Ordinarily, the supreme court will refuse to entertain
such writs unless the jurisdiction of a court of civil appeals has been unsuc-
cessfully sought.3 7 1 Because orders of the supreme court will be treated by
courts of civil appeals as dispositive in a particular matter, if relief is first
sought in the supreme court, attorneys for parties to a related matter
should provide a court of civil appeals with information on action previ-
ously taken by the supreme court so that the court of civil appeals will
know what grounds for relief were considered by the supreme court,
whether the supreme court evaluated the petition on its merits, or whether
it deferred consideration to a court of civil appeals.372
CollateralAttack. Except for a proceeding by bill of review, an attempt to
alter the disposition of property in a divorce decree by a subsequent suit
constitutes a collateral attack on the judgment and will fail. Thus, an as-
sertion in a new action that the post-divorce receipt of renewal commis-
sions by a life insurance agent constitutes community property is barred as
res judicata when the issue was argued and resolved in the suit for di-
vorce.373 Similarly, an ex-wife awarded a fixed amount representing one-
half of the 1971 value of the family homestead cannot effectively assert a
one-half interest in the present value of the property eight years later.374
Effects of Bankruptcy on Property Division. Questions of the dis-
chargeability of property settlements and property divisions will continue
to be raised under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 3 7 5 as under the
earlier act.376 As most recently emphasized in Harbour v. Harbour,377 the
ex-spouse challenging a discharge must show that the obligation was in the
nature of alimony, support, and maintenance rather than a property settle-
ment or property division. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals last
reviewed a Texas case of this sort in 1975,378 the court concluded that a
money judgment awarded by a divorce court to an ex-wife for reimburse-
ment or repayment of a loan constituted an "alimony substitute" for dis-
charge purposes. 379 The test, however, must be formulated by the state
courts.380 A divorce court's award for a wife's attorney's services are in the
370. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1824a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
371. Exparte Dillard, 577 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, no writ).
372. 572 S.W.2d at 522.
373. Bray v. Bray, 576 S.W.2d 664, 665-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
When the trial court commits judicial error in wrongly characterizing marital property, the
litigant's recourse is a direct appeal. Id.
374. McLemore v. Johnston, 585 S.W.2d 347, 348-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no
writ).
375. II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1978), effective October 1, 1979.
376. For a discussion of the application of the previous act, see McKnight, Family Law-
Husband and W!fe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 143-44 (1979), McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 133 (1978).
377. 590 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
378. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
379. Id. at 1027.
380. See Barth v. Barth, 448 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aft'd without published opin-
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nature of support and thus are not subject to discharge in bankruptcy.38'
If attorney's fees are treated as an integral part of the property division on
divorce, 382 however, an award for attorney's fees would be properly
treated as discharged in bankruptcy. 383
ion, 590 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1978). See also In re Shacter, 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md. 1979); cf.
In re Albin, 591 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1979) (court applied law of Virginia).
381. Silcott v. Wilson, 579 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ). See
also In re Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1979); Deems v. Schauer, 470 F. Supp. 255,
257 (D.N.D. 1979).
382. See notes 368-69 supra and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1975), in which the court
comments on California authorities.
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